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Abstract
The South of Market neighborhood in San Francisco has undergone several
transformations, especially since WWII, that have largely characterized the broader relationships
among local city government, private interests, and the public in San Francisco. These
transformations have included deindustrialization and the restructuring of the local economy
after WWII, Urban Renewal, the intensification of office uses, and the first and second
technology booms. City planning and the implementation of area plans (a type of city planning
development tool) have also played a significant role in facilitating these changes. By historically
situating the current moment in San Francisco, this research paper seeks to better understand the
role of planning in facilitating these changes during this current moment of tremendous wealth in
San Francisco, ushered in by a second technology boom. Specifically, this research paper seeks
to critically analyze the neighborhood area plan, the Central SoMa Plan, and speculate on the
possible impacts of the plan. Based on the history of development and change in the South of
Market, and a review of existing area plans, the argument is made that the changes proposed in
the Central SoMa Plan work to actively restructure the neighborhood in order to allow for highend development at the expense of existing working class residents, low-income communities,
and blue-collar jobs.
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Introduction

As San Francisco undergoes a second technology boom, massive amounts of wealth from
both inside the country as well as abroad are flooding the small, roughly seven by seven mile
city. This capital is fueling the development of tech office towers and luxury condos, and luring
wealthy technology companies and highly paid white-collar employees to the city. Further, as
Silicon Valley plays host to some of the biggest names in tech, the valley’s inability to provide
housing for its employees, in addition to the attractiveness of San Francisco as a hub for culture
and social life, has meant that San Francisco has become the bedroom community for Silicon
Valley. This combination of forces has created a dynamic in which higher paying individuals and
businesses are actively displacing existing residents, businesses, and community serving
institutions.
This paper argues that the result of San Francisco’s continued role as an important node
for both national as well as international capitalism is the evisceration of existing communities,
cultures, and peoples. Neoliberal city policies, such as the “Twitter tax break,” have further
worked to help sustain and promote these forces. In addition, as will be explored more in depth,
urban planners have also played a key role in facilitating this dynamic. As waves of wealth
consume the city, average working class people, disproportionately people of color, are being
removed as higher-paying uses replace the existing community.
The research in this paper will contribute to a topic that gets little media or public
attention: neighborhood development plans that have immense public, cultural, and community
ramifications. Specifically, this paper will focus on the Central SoMa Plan, initiated in 2011 by
the Planning Department and headed for likely adoption by the Board of Supervisors in 2017, to
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situate the larger planning/growth debate in San Francisco. By critically analyzing the Central
SoMa Plan, the importance of understanding such projects will become apparent; neighborhood
plans are often ignored, yet they have the ability to foment significant change. Further, as other
neighborhoods are planned for rezoning and development in San Francisco, this case study will
provide a guide to understanding other neighborhood-wide development plans as well. The
changes that are occurring in San Francisco are no accident. Current city development plans, as
seen in the neighborhood area plan the Central SoMa Plan, prioritize high end office and housing
development at the expense of existing blue-collar jobs, working class residents, and low-income
communities.
This paper is structured as follows. First, a literature review provides an overview of the
existing literature surrounding different types of development and planning as they relate to
displacement and/or unequal development. This is followed by an explanation of the rationale for
this paper as well as the data and methods used. Part one of the paper explores the social and
economic history of the South of Market (from the late nineteenth century up to the present), and
the South of Market’s relation to downtown as well as larger social and economic trends in San
Francisco. Part two discusses the role of urban planning, specifically focusing on area plans in
San Francisco, and looks at three examples of existing area plans - The Downtown Plan, The
Eastern Neighborhoods Plan, and the Western SoMa Community Plan. Part three critically
analyzes the Central SoMa plan, offering a description, background, and critique of the plan. Part
four looks at alternative visions of development, planning, and growth in cities by exploring
Susan S. Fainstein’s concept of the “just city.” This is followed by an analytical reflection of a
summer internship with a community organization in the South of Market as well as a set of
policy recommendations surrounding planning, development, and growth in San Francisco.
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Literature Review

This section gives an overview of the existing literature surrounding different types of
development and planning as they relate to displacement and/or unequal development. This will
help set the context for the rest of the paper and the discussion of current development plans in
San Francisco as seen through the area plan the Central SoMa Plan. It will further set the
foundation for which the paper will seek to build on in terms of adding to the existing literature.

Old Forms of Top-Down Planning and Development as Destructive and Negative

Past forms of top-down urban planning and development in the United States are often
looked at as lessons to learn from in current planning debates. Specifically, the federal program
of Urban Renewal is largely viewed as a negative and destructive top-down form of planning
that led to widespread social disruption and displacement across the United States.
As Scott Greer describes, the United States federal government undertook the program of
Urban Renewal to address what it described as “blighted” areas or “slums” in cities across the
United States, demolishing low-cost housing through local powers of eminent domain in lowincome communities.1 Richard Walega details how at the height of Urban Renewal, the program
was operating in 962 localities throughout the United States and costs ran into the billions.2
Focusing on the specific case of urban renewal in the Western Addition in San Francisco,
Walega discusses how the A-1 and A-2 phases of urban renewal in this neighborhood sought to
reverse the trends of perceived “blight” and “social degradation” by engaging in a “public
1

Greer, Scott A. Urban renewal and American cities: the dilemma of democratic intervention. Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1966, 3.
2
Walega, Richard A. The failure of federal influence: urban renewal and relocation in San Francisco, 1954-1972.
1977, 1.
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partnership with the private sector…to improve the neighborhood.”3 Walega continues, stating
that redevelopment was meant to serve commercial, financial, and other corporate enterprises as
well as meet the needs of young suburban professionals coming to the city for job opportunities
by providing them with adequate land for housing.4
As Chester Hartman describes, the A-1 phase of urban renewal in the Western Addition,
along with other projects like it around the country, had many in the United States re-naming the
redevelopment and urban renewal process “Negro removal,” because so many displacees were
African American (though the African American population did continue to grow in San
Francisco during this period). Hartman continues stating that many of those displaced from the
A-1 area in the Western Addition were relocated in the A-2 area, only to be displaced a second
time as the A-2 phase of urban renewal proceeded to displace 13,500, mainly Black, residents.5
The author writes that “Even though neighborhood opposition to A-2 had resulted in the
construction of several publicly assisted housing projects, there was a gap of many years before
completed projects could provide housing for displaced residents, the number of replacement
units did not come close to equaling the number torn down, and new rents were far higher than
old rents.”6
The South of Market neighborhood in San Francisco was also targeted for urban renewal
during this time period. As Hartman describes, certain areas in the South of Market were
dubiously deemed “blighted” and the City sought to develop these areas as the Yerba Buena
Center with a convention center to attract business, eventually destroying the existing housing in
the area. The nearly 4,000 people living in the redevelopment area were mainly older, retired,
3

Ibid., 52.
Ibid., 54.
5
Hartman, Chester W. City for sale : the transformation of San Francisco. Berkeley: University of California Press,
2002, 63-64.
6
Ibid., 63.
4
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working class white men living in residential hotels. Residents organized against urban renewal
and formed the group Tenants and Owners in Opposition to Redevelopment (TOOR),
successfully fighting to have some replacement low-income senior housing built to offset the
destruction of existing housing (though people were still displaced). TOOR eventually evolved
into the affordable housing non-profit developer Tenants and Owners Development Corporation
(TODCO), which is still in operation today. While initial plans for redevelopment in the South of
Market were approved in 1966, the building of the Moscone convention center and later the
Yerba Buena Gardens cultural/art facilities lasted several decades.7

The Growth Imperative and American Cities

The idea of growth is central to many of the planning and development debates currently
occurring in cities. When analyzing proposals for growth within cities, it is crucial to ask: growth
for who and growth for what? As Douglas Holtz-Eaken describes in a report for the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce Foundation, slow economic growth in the United States challenges both
the future of the country as well as the American dream. As the report states:
we believe that every policy decision in today’s debate can be - and must be - evaluated through a single
prism: Will it accelerate growth and create jobs? And because global competitiveness and continuous
innovation are so essential to any growth strategy in the 21st century economy, policymakers must also ask
if the policies will enhance America’s competitiveness and unleash innovation, technology, and
entrepreneurship… America’s future and standard of living are in jeopardy if our country does not adopt
pro-growth economic policies.8

The report suggests that growth is not inevitable, but is instead a concrete policy choice that must
be aggressively implemented. As Holtz-Eaken argues in the report, America must return to

7

Ibid., 13, 60-61, 69, 115, 213, 216-225.
Holtz-Eaken, Douglas. The Growth Imperative: How Slow Growth Threatens Our Future and the American
Dream. Washington, DC:US Chamber Foundation, 2014, 1. Accessed April, 2017.
https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/sites/default/files/The%20Growth%20Imperative.pdf
8
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previous growth rates, creating jobs for the middle-class and pulling the U.S. away from debt.
Such policy proposals include entitlement reform, (corporate) tax reform, (corporate) regulation
reform, energy reform, and additional free trade agreements (all classic conservative goals). Such
reform is said to benefit all Americans.9
As the San Francisco Bay Area Planning and Urban Research Association (SPUR), a
prominent urban think tank in San Francisco, describes, “SPUR works to channel the Bay Area’s
growth into existing cities…These historic central cities…have the infrastructure in place to
support continued growth.”10 As seen through SPUR, pro-growth ideology is inherent to their
concept of how cities change through time. The focus is on accelerating and supporting
“continued” growth. In another report by SPUR, the organization argues the need to expand
(grow) San Francisco’s economic base, and challenges opponents writing:
Critics suggest that this approach to economic development ignores the economic challenges facing lowincome residents or neighborhoods. They are wrong. The whole point of helping the economic base is to
make sure that the city has a healthy economy to begin with. It is the spending by the economic base that
creates the demand for the neighborhood-serving businesses that are the bulk of total employment. If there
are no export-oriented firms that sell beyond the city, the economy will decline.11

Thus the argument is made that everyone, regardless of income, will benefit from growth and
new development.

New Forms of Planning and Development as Breaking with the Past

Often measuring against the past ills of Urban Renewal, new forms of urban planning and
development in the United States have taken place, with some characterizing these new plans as
9

Ibid., 8.
SPUR’s Agenda for Change in the San Francisco Bay Area. San Francisco: San Francisco Bay Area Planning and
Urban Research Association, 2016, 5. Accessed April, 2017.
https://www.spur.org/sites/default/files/publications_pdfs/SPUR's_Agenda_for_Change_2016.pdf
11
Terplan, Egon. Organizing for Economic Growth: A New Approach to Business Attraction and Retention in San
Francisco. San Francisco: San Francisco Bay Area Planning and Urban Research Association, 2009, 7. Accessed
April, 2017. http://www.spur.org/sites/default/files/migrated/anchors/SPUR_OrganizingforEconomicGrowth.pdf
10
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positive and breaking with the past.
Richard Hu looks at transformations in planning and development in downtown San
Francisco by analyzing the 1972 Urban Design Plan and the 1985 Downtown Plan (an area plan).
Hu argues that these plans represented a paradigm shift in urban planning in San Francisco that
moved away from the top-down process of urban renewal that was “minimally controlled”
towards a responsive, interventionist, and balanced form of planning that guarantees a more
equitable outcome, stating that the Downtown Plan has been successful in creating open space,
preserving historical buildings, and building designs with better “urban form.”12
Further, Marcia Rosen and Wendy Sullivan discuss how in San Francisco as a result of
the past harms of urban renewal, coupled with economic changes and rising housing costs,
activists worked to ensure that new development and redevelopment plans took into account the
housing needs of residents.13 As Rosen and Sullivan write, “By ensuring the creation and
retention of a range of housing to serve diverse resident and community needs within the City,
these forces have counteracted the detrimental effects of gentrification caused by market forces
and have kept affordable community housing in the forefront of the City’s development and
redevelopment decisions.”14 Rosen and Sullivan continue, detailing the Mission Bay project
stating that:
[The Mission Bay project] has set the standard for affordable housing and public benefits in large scale
development that has since been followed in the Hunters Point Shipyard, Treasure Island, and Transbay
Plans. Approximately one-third of the housing units will be permanently affordable and contain housing for
a diverse range of needs, and the new mixed-use neighborhoods will be equipped with child care, health
and social services, as well as amenities such as neighborhood-serving retail, parks, libraries, and schools.15

12

Hu, Richard. “Urban Design Plans for Downtown San Francisco: A Paradigm Shift?” Journal of Urban Design
18, no.4 (2013), 526, 529.
13
Rosen, Marcia, and Wendy Sullivan. From Urban Renewal and Displacement to Economic Inclusion: San
Francisco Affordable Housing Policy, 1978-2012. San Francisco: National Housing Law Project, 2012, 1-2.
Accessed April, 2017. http://www.prrac.org/pdf/SanFranAffHsing.pdf
14
Ibid., 1.
15
Ibid., 30.
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As the authors further write, “By also ensuring that the needs of local residents are heard, San
Francisco is demonstrating that the early urban renewal and displacement days are gone and have
been replaced with a vision of creating the housing, jobs and services required to maintain and
rebuild vibrant, diverse and thriving communities within the City.”16
David Habert, writing for SPUR, backs this claim describing how new redevelopment
plans that are based in community needs are providing more positive examples of
redevelopment. Habert writes, “As funding became less a matter between the federal government
and the Redevelopment Agency, and more a matter of local priorities informed by the
community, redevelopment became a far more sensitive, focused force.”17 Focusing on
redevelopment projects at Mid-Market and Bayview Hunters Point that work to improve the area
without displacement or gentrification, the author writes that “Concerned with holistic
community revitalization, these projects represent a departure from past redevelopment
projects.”18
In a similar vein, Amy Fauria and Shisher Mathur argue that redevelopment in Oakland
California’s central business district in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s led to positive results
such as increased property values as well as other successes in making the area more “vibrant.”
As Fauria and Mathur write, “the redevelopment efforts undertaken during the period 2001–2006
have made observable progress in shifting the Central District from a business district to a more
vibrant urban area that provides employment opportunities, a substantial number of renovated

16

Ibid., 47.
Habert, David, “Fifty Years of Redevelopment: Lessons for the Future,” SPUR. March 1, 1999. Accessed April,
2017. http://www.spur.org/publications/urbanist-article/1999-03-01/fifty-years-redevelopment
18
Ibid.
17
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historic amenities, as well as several new amenities.”19 The authors describe how this was
initiated by the mayor’s 10K Plan whereby a plan was put in place to attract 10,000 new
residents to the central business district into mostly market-rate housing.20

New Forms of Planning and Development as Problematic

Other authors are more skeptical in their views and evaluations of new urban
development plans. Derek Hyra discusses displacement due to new forms of redevelopment as
both populations and capital flow back into cities in what has been termed the “back to the city
movement” and the “new urban renewal.”21,22 Hyra discusses how the “new urban renewal” took
place from 1992-2007 as the federal government invested billions of dollars in redeveloping
public housing, replacing it with mixed-income housing – a process that led to the displacement
of African Americans.23 Mark Davidson touches on this topic by discussing “social mixing”
policies, where the government actively promotes redevelopment projects that aim to
deconcentrate poverty by attracting wealthier individuals into low-income communities to
improve the area.24
One the other hand, the type of new planning and development occurring in the U.S. has
also been characterized as being profit-driven, versus driven by community needs. As Philips,

19

Fauria, Amy, and Shishir Mathur. "Impact of Targeted Redevelopment of Central Business District on Housing
Prices in the Surrounding Neighborhoods: Evidence from Oakland, California." Journal Of Urban Planning &
Development 138, no. 3 (2012), 246.
20
Ibid.
21
Hyra, Derek. "Conceptualizing the New Urban Renewal: Comparing the Past to the Present." Urban Affairs
Review 48, no. 4 (2012). 498-527.
22
Hyra, Derek. "The back-to-the-city movement: Neighbourhood redevelopment and processes of political and
cultural displacement." Urban Studies no.10 (2015). 1753.
23
Hyra, "Conceptualizing the New Urban Renewal: Comparing the Past to the Present," 500.
24
Davidson, Mark. "Spoiled Mixture: Where Does State-led `Positive' Gentrification End?." Urban Studies no. 12
(2008). 2385.
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Flores, and Henderson, writing for Causa Justa :: Just Cause, detail, the creation of neoliberal
city development policies began in the 1970s and continues today in full force.25 These profitdriven motives that worked to build up new economic bases and revenue streams in cities “rarely
accounted for the needs and interests of existing residents.”26 As Philips, Flores, and Henderson
detail, one key feature of current neoliberal city development is reliance on the private sector to
serve as the primary driver of economic growth and urban development, writing:
Most development in our cities reflects the priorities of private investors, corporate landlords, and large
business interests. Whether it is a stadium project like the proposed Golden State Warriors waterfront
stadium, a new campus for the biotech industry like Mission Bay, or hundreds of units of condos in
downtown like Forest City, private interests dominate decisions about what gets developed, where, and
when.27

Further commenting on the current state of development plans in San Francisco,
community planner Fernando Martí discusses the regionally adopted “Plan Bay Area” which
calls for adding new housing units, jobs, people and cars into the Bay Area, including San
Francisco, in the next thirty years to accommodate “growth,” all in the name of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. Elaborating on these plans for San Francisco, Martí argues that under
these plans, planning will be streamlined (undercutting zoning and environmental regulations to
expedite building). Further, areas designated under the plan for redevelopment are primarily
working class neighborhoods and neighborhoods of color, which Plan Bay Area has deemed
“communities of concern” that are vulnerable to displacement due to new development.28 Martí
notes that Plan Bay Area does not address the issue of displacement of existing residents from
existing communities writing:
25

Philips, Dawn, Luis Flores, Jr., Jamila Henderson. Development without displacement: resisting gentrification in
the Bay Area. Oakland: Causa Justa::Just Cause, 2013, 30-35. Accessed April, 2017. https://cjjc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/development-without-displacement.pdf
26
Ibid., 30.
27
Ibid., 32-33.
28
Martí, Fernando. Whose Future?: ‘Smart Growth’ in San Francisco. San Francisco: San Francisco Information
Clearinghouse, 2013, 1-2. Accessed April, 2017. http://www.sfccho.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Whose-Futurefinal.pdf
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By its own admission, Plan Bay Area will increase the risk of neighborhood disruption and displacement of
existing residents and businesses, especially among the city's working class communities. The fact that the
Plan readily acknowledges that the potential for “community disruption” and displacement will increase
under the proposed Plan Bay Area scenario by 71% (from 21% displacement potential under its 2040
Baseline forecast to 36% displacement potential under Plan Bay Area) and yet offers no substantive or
enforceable mitigations or solutions, is shocking.29

Martí argues that the supply and demand basis for Plan Bay Area redevelopment is false, noting
that it is based in neoliberal trickle-down economics.30

Community Responses to Planning and Development

Urban development plans and projects in San Francisco, both past and present, have not
occurred without responses from the community. Some have differing degrees of success in
accomplishing their goals, yet community engagement with the planning process and resistance
to developer-driven proposals have been common themes surrounding development in San
Francisco.
Brahinsky shows that the way that urban renewal unfolded in Bayview Hunters Point was
not a universal San Francisco experience, in terms of the degree of displacement. Describing the
efforts of the “Big Five” organizers in Bayview Hunters Point who were all female, the author
shows how this group worked to demand resources from the then shrinking redevelopment
agency/Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in order to carry out
community-directed redevelopment projects in Bayview Hunters Point. As the author shows,
organizers fought to have new affordable housing built in an area known as Hunters Point Hill.
While the massive displacement seen in the Fillmore did not occur here, some residents were still
displaced, and the lack of economic development ultimately proved to be a huge drawback in the

29
30

Ibid., 2.
Ibid., 3-4.
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redevelopment of the area.31
Another instance of community forces organizing to take control of urban renewal and
the top-down process is shown by Eduardo Contreras, where organizing in the Mission District is
shown to have led to different outcomes than were seen in the Western Addition and the Fillmore
in the face of urban renewal. Contreras describes how Latinos and their allies organized the
community and created a group called “Mission Council on Redevelopment” (MCOR) that
sought to take direct local control of the urban renewal process, ultimately allying with white
liberals to defeat the redevelopment proposal when full community control failed to
materialize.32
Again looking to organizing that took place in the Mission District, Brahinsky, Feldstein,
and Chion look at how during the creation of the Eastern Neighborhoods Plan in the early
2000’s, a neighborhood area plan for new development, activists and organizers in the Mission
worked to implement community based planning goals within the plan during its development.
Brahinsky et al. discuss how the Mission Anti-Displacement Coalition (MAC) based in the
Mission successfully organized a community planning effort to work both in conjunction with
and parallel to the Planning Department, where the group ultimately shifted the focus of the
Planning Department to realize the issues regarding affordable housing, cultural values, and
neighborhood assets.33
Economic geographer David Harvey writes that in the United States there has been a
backlash by urban social movements against “developers, who are backed by finance, corporate
31

Brahinsky, Rachel. “Race and the Making of Southeast San Francisco: Towards a Theory of Race-Class.”
Antipode 46, no.5 (2013), 1265-1270.
32
Contreras, Eduardo. “Voice and Property: Latinos, White Conservatives, and Urban Renewal in 1960’s San
Francisco.” Western Historical Quarterly 45, no.3 (2014), 253.
33
Brahinsky, Rachel, Miriam Chion, and Lisa M. Feldstein. “Reflections on Community Planning in San
Francisco.” Spatial Justice 5, (2013). Accessed April, 2017. http://www.jssj.org/article/reflexions-sur-lecommunity-planning-a-san-francisco/
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capital and an increasingly entrepreneurially minded local state apparatus.”34 It is in this context
that Harvey argues for “the right to the city,” or the right to change ourselves by changing the
city, something the author notes is one of the most precious yet neglected of our human rights.35
Philips, Flores, and Henderson make the argument that in order for development to have
different results than in the past, specifically in San Francisco and the Bay Area, “public
agencies must support models of housing and community development that prioritize resident
ownership and capacity-building over profit generation” while at the same time preventing
harmful speculation.36 They continue, stating that in order to prevent displacement of existing
communities and residents, land use planning and development must not only involve input from
affected community residents, but must also happen in partnership with them on a continual
basis.37

What has Been Left Out?

While there has been discussion surrounding the impacts of new forms of redevelopment
plans and projects in San Francisco and the Bay Area (Rosen and Sullivan 2012, Habbert 1999,
Fauria and Mathur 2012), the academic literature is lacking in research surrounding other forms
of development occurring in San Francisco that are outside of the former redevelopment agency
(redevelopment agencies were dissolved in California in 2012).
More specifically, with the exception of Brahinsky, Felstein, and Chion (2012) and Hu
(2013), there is a lack of academic literature on the topic of neighborhood area plans in San
34

Harvey, David. “The Right to the City.” New Left Review 53 (2008). Accessed April, 2017.
https://newleftreview.org/II/53/david-harvey-the-right-to-the-city
35
Ibid.
36
Philips, Flores, Henderson, Development without displacement, 80.
37
Ibid.
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Francisco. My research will seek to fill this gap in the literature by looking at the Central SoMa
Plan as well as the larger growth debate happening in San Francisco surrounding planning and
development.
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Rationale for this Research Paper

This paper seeks to critically analyze and historically situate the Central SoMa Plan to
help make sense of the meanings and implications of this effort by the city of San Francisco to
alter who lives and works in the South of Market, and ultimately the larger city of San Francisco.
In doing this, the paper seeks to make an argument about the potentials for displacement as a
result of the changes made under the Central SoMa Plan, specifically of blue-collar jobs,
working class residents, and low-income communities.
As San Francisco continues down a path of embracing the technology sector, while
evictions and displacement continue unabated, this is essential to understand. Though it is a
relatively un-examined plan that only looks at one neighborhood, the Central SoMa Plan raises
many core questions facing the city and planners alike: Who or what is San Francisco planning
for, and what is the future envisioned by city officials and planners?

Data and Methods

Both qualitative and quantitative data analysis is used in this research paper. Qualitative
data analysis included looking at neighborhood area plans and reports and finding themes and
indications of intent. When it comes to the Central SoMa Plan especially, this allowed for
speculation on the potential impacts of the Plan. Quantitative data was drawn from City
commissioned studies, census data, and other existing data studies from other relevant
organizations. Methods included interviews, a deep literature review, and historical analysis.
These methods were used to help speculate about possible impacts of the Central SoMa Plan.
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Part 1: Social and Economic History of the South of Market and Relation to Downtown

This section will provide a social and economic history of the South of Market, as well as
other relevant social and economic trends in San Francisco and the downtown core as they relate
to the South of Market. First, the period roughly from the first inhabitants of the area through the
late 19th and early 20th centuries in the South of Market will be discussed. This is followed by a
history of the WWII and post-WWII period in San Francisco where the city underwent an
economic restructuring. Then the period of urban renewal in the South of Market is discussed,
followed by a discussion of the highrise expansion in the 1960’s, 70’s, and 80’s, which coincided
with an anti-highrise movement and the passage of Proposition M in 1986. Then the changing
nature of work and the shift towards an “hourglass economy” in San Francisco will be discussed,
concluding with a discussion of the first and second technology booms centered around the
South of Market.

Original Inhabitants and the late 19th/early 20th Century South of Market

The South of Market neighborhood is located in the north-eastern portion of San
Francisco, generally bounded by Market Street, the San Francisco Bay, and Highway 101 (see
Fig. 1). The area has traditionally been home to different waves of working class immigrants and
has historically been an industrial and blue-collar area.
The original inhabitants of areas near the South of Market, probably closer to the Bay,
were people from the Yelamu tribal territory of the Ohlone. The original ecological makeup of
the area, now known as South of Market, was largely sand dunes, marshlands, and water.

20

Spanish conquest of San Francisco, which marked the beginning of the decimation of the local
Ohlone population due to colonization, eventually gave way to more permanent Mexican
settlement following Mexican independence from Spain.38
While there was less activity in the South of Market Area during the periods of Spanish
and Mexican occupation, the seizure of California by the United States government in 1848 (via
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo) following the Mexican-American War combined with the
discovery of gold in California (and later silver in Nevada) caused a population explosion in San
Francisco and the South of Market. What followed was the increased development of industry
(shipping, warehousing, manufacturing, and iron and steel working) and housing in the South of
Market, the former largely due to the location’s proximity to the Bay (location for trade) and the
large street pattern that existed. Smaller scale commercial development also occurred closer to
Market Street in the later 19th century, as well as the development of wholesalers and service
industries.39
In the second half of the 19th century, Irish immigrants became the dominant group
living in the South of Market, along with mainly other European groups. It was also during this
time that infrastructure development occurred to expand the area, including the levelling of sand
dunes, filling of creeks and marshes, creation of streets, and the development of bridges and rail
service. Following the 1906 earthquake, which largely levelled the South of Market, the area’s
industrial uses came to dominant reconstruction, with commercial and residential (including
many residential hotels) uses also being reconstructed. During this period, the population of the
area greatly declined, and those that remained were largely white American-born single males,
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with some foreign-born Europeans, as well as enclaves of Greek and Japanese immigrants and
later Filipino immigrants (who continue to have a presence in the South of Market and constitute
one of the largest ethnic minorities in the area).40 Two “main stems” that grew up after the
earthquake in the South of Market included 3rd Street and Howard Street. On 3rd Street, many
men would come to gamble in the saloons, and the Howard Street area came to be known as “the
slave market” because of the “extraordinary exploitation and suffering that migratory and
unskilled workers were subject to.”41 The area was still largely working class, as was especially
evident in the historic 1934 Waterfront Strike of the longshoremen.42,43 Up until WWII and
especially following the general strike, there were high rates of unionization amongst the city’s
(mainly white) workers, with, as one example, nearly 100% of the city’s restaurant’s being
unionized in San Francisco by the beginning of WWII.44 The late 19th/early 20th century period
in the South of Market was marked by a reserve of skilled and unskilled workers, hotels, lodging
houses, saloons, pawnshops, secondhand stores, employment agencies, poolrooms, movie
theaters, barber colleges, missions, and the headquarters of the Industrial Workers of the World
(IWW).45 As described by Rebecca Solnit:
It was a rough neighborhood, but it well served the old and infirm workingmen who could live there on
savings, small pensions, and Social Security...Many of these men - and they were mostly men, though some
women lived there as well - had worked on the waterfront in earlier decades. Some of them still bore the
stamp of the radical politics and great labor battles of the 1930s and earlier.46
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WWII, Post WWII, and the Economic Restructuring of San Francisco and the Bay Area

WWII brought major migration to the Bay Area as people came to work in the war
industry. Migration to the South of Market included African Americans, some Latinos, white
Dust Bowl migrants, and larger numbers of Filipinos.47 By 1960, the area was 75% white, 14%
Black, and 9% Asian.48 WWII also brought massive investment and development (especially
from the federal government and especially in California). This spurred economic growth and set
up the West to emerge from the war as an “economic pace-setter for the nation.”49 In San
Francisco, the post-WWII deindustrialization of the city was part of a larger regional
restructuring of the Bay Area economy. In this regional economic restructuring, shipping moved
to Oakland, heavy industry moved to the north and the East Bay, high-tech industries grew
around universities and military bases, and San Francisco was imagined as the corporate
headquarters of the region.50 As described by Chris Carlsson:
What began as an effort to circumvent organized workers in San Francisco by regionalizing the local
economy became a model for the globalization that has swept the world in the past quarter-century. San
Francisco has been an important test site for our society’s most advanced techniques for improving and
extending the control of capitalism.51

Richard DeLeon expands on this economic restructuring of San Francisco and the Bay Area
writing:
Those who conceptualized the progrowth regime envisaged downtown San Francisco as the Bay Area’s
commercial, financial, and administrative headquarters linking the United States to an emerging
transpacific urban community that included Singapore, Seoul, Hong Kong, Tokyo, and other cities of the
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Far East. This ambition to make San Francisco a “world class” city and a gateway to the Pacific Rim dates
back to wartime planning studies in the early 1940s.52

In the South of Market following the war, the area still remained largely working class
and single men, and the area remained affordable to live in; however, this reality was quickly
challenged by larger forces in San Francisco and the region that sought to reimagine the city and
the Bay Area.53 Such regional planning and related efforts in the Bay Area were first experienced
through the coordination and implementation of wartime spending and development in the Bay
Area. During WWII, the Metropolitan Defense Committee (MDC) was set up as the Bay Area’s
first regional planning agency, “composed of political appointees and influential citizens, mainly
businessmen…[and] established a working model for later, more sophisticated modes of regional
coordination and planning.”54 The MDC led to the creation of the Bay Regional Council in 1944
which changed its name to the Bay Area Council (BAC) in 1945.55 The BAC is “a private
regional government whose purpose is to coordinate and plan functions especially important to
the efficient conduct of business throughout the entire Bay Area.”56 The BAC worked to
regionally designate various parts of the region for specific economic activities. As Hartman
writes:
Thus, the East Bay is the locus for heavier industry, chemicals, and petroleum and also serves as the
regional transportation hub. The peninsula and South Bay are areas for light manufacturing, electronics,
and the aerospace industry. Alameda, Contra Costa, and San Mateo Counties support recent secondary
office development. San Francisco is the center for administration, finance, consulting, and entertainment.57

The creation of a complex freeway system (beginning in the 1950’s) in the Bay Area and the
construction of the Bay Area Rapid Transit system (BART - a direct BAC product, drawn up by

52

DeLeon, Richard E. Left Coast City: Progressive Politics in San Francisco, 1975-1991. Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1992, 41.
53
Hartman, City for Sale, 59-60.
54
Ibid., 6.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid., 6-7.

24

the Bechtel Corporation, and built in the 1960’s) were also an integral part of this restructuring
(especially BART), positioning San Francisco in the middle of it all.58,59
Describing this period and the resulting post-WWII “progrowth regime,” DeLeon writes,
“The city’s top business and political leaders invented the progrowth regime to transform San
Francisco into a growth machine. The city’s function would be to provide the physical and social
means of capitalist production and accumulation within a global division of labor.”60 The
changes produced by these forces would prove to be lasting and provoked major opposition from
many of the city’s residents, neighborhoods, and communities.

Urban Renewal

Part of this regional restructuring also included the use of redevelopment, a program
being implemented in cities across the United States following the war. One of the most well
documented and well-known phases of urban planning in the United States came in the form of
urban renewal where by specific communities that were deemed blighted were targeted for
demolition and redevelopment across the United States. Here in San Francisco, two of the most
infamous cases of urban renewal, though not the only cases, occurred in the Western Addition
and the South of Market. Marked by the demolition of housing units and small businesses, and
the massive displacement of majority low-income residents and residents of color, urban renewal
in San Francisco came to be seen as a destructive force by many in the targeted communities. In
the wake of such concerted efforts by the City of San Francisco to remove low-income residents
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and residents of color from the City, community groups sprung up to challenge and oppose the
top-down process of urban renewal. Using their voices, their bodies, the courts, and the ballot
box, sustained efforts were made, though with varying degrees of success, to prevent any further
demolition and displacement of existing communities in the Western Addition and South of
Market.
The story of Urban Renewal continues to play an important symbolic role in planning and
urban development in San Francisco. Often judged as a classic case of destructive top-down
urban planning that does not take into account the concerns and needs of community residents,
new rounds of urban development in San Francisco many times use this as a talking point to
prove that new types of urban development are the exact opposite - inclusive and beneficial to all
members of the community.61 For both its historic and symbolic roles, it is important to analyze
and understand what led to the process of urban renewal and what its lasting effects were. With a
clear understanding of the motives and outcomes of urban renewal, specifically looking at the
case in the South of Market, better sense can be made of what exactly happened and how or if
things have changed today for urban development and planning processes in San Francisco.
The process of urban renewal in the South of Market and subsequent redevelopment
spanned several decades and several mayors. The process was never clear and straightforward the redevelopment areas and projects were continually subject to change, and there was sustained
community resistance to the various planning processes and plan projects. Chester Hartman
gives a thorough overview of redevelopment in the South of Market in his book City for Sale:
The Transformation of San Francisco. As he describes, the larger impetus for redevelopment of
the South of Market was the ultimate expansion of the downtown financial district into the more
61
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industrial South of Market. As discussed earlier, in the post-WWII period, San Francisco worked
to re-imagine itself as the economic and financial headquarters of the Western Pacific Rim. With
corporate interests such as Bank of America, Standard Oil of California, Pacific Gas and
Electric, Bechtel, and others leading the way, local organizations were created and the local
government was brought into the fold as concrete on the ground committees and bodies were
needed and necessary to carry out the actual functions of this economic restructuring. Some of
the most important groups created in this process included the BAC, the Blyth-Zellerbach
Committee (a more covert body composed of BAC members), and the San Francisco Planning
and Urban Renewal Association (SPUR - a direct product of the Blyth-Zellerbach Committee),
later changing the “renewal” to “research.” SPUR’s role was to provide and drum-up open
support for urban renewal in San Francisco and carry out many of the functions of the corporate
interests at the local level, specifically in terms of organizing and planning the early phases of
the redevelopment process in the South of Market in conjunction with the San Francisco
Redevelopment Agency (SFRA).62
When SPUR was initially conceived, it received direct funding from various
corporations, many of whose directors sat on the board of SPUR. SPUR took immediate aim at
the South of Market for redevelopment, and in 1960 the mayor of San Francisco, George
Christopher, designated SPUR as the City’s “Citizens’ Advisory Committee.” This committee
was required under federal urban renewal law, and the body, acting as a citizen’s group,
subsequently gave its approval for redevelopment in the South of Market and the mayor moved
to request that the SFRA undertake urban renewal in the South of Market. Plans for
redevelopment in the South of Market grew out of an earlier failed attempt by a wealthy
businessman, Benjamin Swig, to clear and redevelop the South of Market into a commercial
62
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zone proposed to contain a convention center, sports stadium, high-rise offices, a parking lot, a
transportation terminal, a hotel, an auditorium and theater, and a large shopping center.63
Portions of Swig’s plan were ultimately revived by the SFRA, and a plan was
implemented to redevelop the area into a convention-sports-office center. In addition to a
massive budget, large staff, and federal powers of eminent domain, the SFRA also had general
autonomy from City Hall and acted largely as an independent body. While urban renewal in the
South of Market went through various phases of planning and development, the process
ultimately led to the demolition and displacement of housing units, businesses, and residents.
Many of the housing units lost were part of the city’s affordable housing stock, and the
businesses displaced had served the residents of the area who were primarily low-income and
working class seniors. The most sustained response to urban renewal in the South of Market
came from the community group Tenants and Owners in Opposition to Redevelopment (TOOR)
who challenged the legality of the forced removal of residents (done without securing
replacement housing). Through their opposition, TOOR won some replacement housing
developments that have remained as permanent affordable low-income senior housing in the
South of Market, and the legacy of the group survives today as the non-profit housing developer
Tenants and Owners Development Corporation (TODCO).64
What ultimately resulted from the redevelopment of the South of Market was the
construction of the Moscone convention center (later expanded), Yerba Buena Gardens, Center
for the Arts, and Children’s Center (built with pressure from community activists to make the
space more creative and publicly accessible), the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, and the
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Metreon entertainment center.65,66 The sites surrounding the redevelopment area were developed
into new hotels, offices, apartments, condos, some more cultural facilities and some affordable
housing. Further, the majority of office construction continued through the 1970’s in the South of
Market, especially in the area directly across from the financial district to the east of the Yerba
Buena redevelopment zone.67 As Hartman writes,
San Francisco’s development history in the post-World War II period has been overwhelmingly dominated
by business interests, by those in the position to reap the largest profits from this development. They have
by and large controlled and peopled the city’s government at all levels. They have established their own
planning and watchdog mechanisms and agencies, and funded others, to ensure the kind of future they
want...it is a confluence of powerful public- and private-sector actors operating in their class and personal
interests.68

Highrise Expansion, the Anti-highrise Movement, and 1986 Proposition M

The necessary components for the skyscraper emerged from the mines years before the Hallidie Building
[the world’s first glass-sheathed curtain-wall building and an eight-story prototype for postwar skyscrapers]
or its taller neighbors in the financial district appeared...Ventilators, high-speed safety elevators, the early
use of electric lighting and telephones, all were demanded and paid for by the prodigious output and
prospects of the hydraulic mines of California and the hardrock mines of the Comstock Lode...As office
buildings climbed higher, they produced for their owners profits in ground rents comparable to or
exceeding those extracted from their mines - and far more lasting. Such buildings were among the choicest
legacies that mining magnates passed on to their children. In doing so, they assured their families dynastic
security and power.69
- Gray Brechin, from the section “Financial Districts as Inverted Minescapes”

As redevelopment unfolded in the South of Market, other populations began inhabiting
the still affordable housing that was located there. During the 1960’s, 1970’s, and 1980’s the area
saw an influx of artists, activists, non-profit groups, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
queer (LGBTQ) communities including many LGBTQ oriented businesses (bars, bathhouses,
65
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dance clubs). A gay leather community was also established in the South of Market, whose
history is still evident through the Folsom Street Fair that happens every year.70
This time period also saw the most intense boom in office construction in San Francisco
up to that point in history. Between 1965 - 1981, San Francisco doubled its amount of office
space reaching 55 million square feet, the majority of it located downtown and in the South of
Market.71 As Alvin Duskin writes:
So San Francisco was going to become the headquarters city for the western states and for the Pacific.
Winning that meant giving up what San Francisco was - a city of people who lived here, who raised their
children here and who spent a lot of time playing, eating, walking, living in the city. And winning at
headquarters city of the Pacific meant - because San Francisco is so much smaller in land area than New
York - building an even more concentrated city: the Ultimate Highrise.72

For several decades up until 1959, there was only one major high-rise office tower constructed in
San Francisco - the Crown Zellerbach building on Market Street completed in 1959.73 That
would change as highrises began dotting the downtown financial district. Bruce Brugmann
describes the forces behind the highrise boom in San Francisco, writing:
It wasn’t the invisible hand of Adam Smith at work that tossed skyscrapers into San Francisco like Lincoln
logs. It was a concentrated panoply of land and development forces and their power bloc of Bay Area
Council/Chamber of Commerce/SPUR/Downtown Association that successfully promoted the key
elements of big development policy: BART to bring commuters in and out, the Downtown Zoning Plan of
1967/the Urban Design Plan of 1971 to grease the way for more and more skyscrapers, highrise
Redevelopment that started and then fueled the highrise boom in downtown San Francisco in the early and
mid-1960s...The crucial point is that the forces making San Francisco the Wall Street of the West have
worked hand in hand for years with City Hall.74

Hartman describes the 1968 downtown zoning study (above quoted as the “Downtown Zoning
Plan of 1967”), the 1971 urban design plan, and the 1972 establishment of height limit districts
in the city as “at the time, a modicum of order regarding disorderly high-rise development” that
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activists still saw as in need of outside influence to prevent the “Manhattanization” of San
Francisco.75
Prior to 1968, downtown San Francisco had minimal zoning controls with no limits on
height, bulk, or use.76 The 1968 downtown zoning ordinance created four downtown use districts
that “generously permitted, as of right, nearly all commercial uses, including office towers of
almost limitless height and bulk, throughout the downtown area.”77 Reflecting on the height and
bulk controls of the 1971 urban design plan, Vettel writes “the height and bulk controls have had
their urban design impact in residential neighborhoods [by respecting the scale of the
neighborhood]...[they have not] adequately protected the central office district
environment...structures too large to be integrated successfully into the city’s fiber have been
approved under the ordinance.”78
The explosion in downtown development drew waves of community activism in
opposition to what was characterized as the Manhattanization of San Francisco. The anti-highrise
movement grew out of activism from the Marina, Telegraph Hill, and Haight-Ashbury where
residents were involved in stopping continued freeway construction and expansion that was
planned for almost every part of the city. Attempts in the 1960’s and early 1970’s included
architectural preservationists and environmentalists who fought the design and poor location of
highrises. This was followed by attempts by Alvin Duskin to impose height limits on new
developments, as well as several other attempts by organizers at the ballot box to limit height,
bulk, and development, eventually culminating in the successful passage of Proposition M in
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1986 which most significantly limited the construction of new office space in San Francisco to
950,000 square feet annually (allowing roll-over into following years).79
Also reacting to the rapid construction of highrises, the progressive newspaper The San
Francisco Bay Guardian published the book The Ultimate Highrise: San Francisco’s Mad Rush
Toward the Sky… in 1971, which provided “The world’s first comprehensive study of the true
costs of skyscrapers, done by a special Guardian task force scouring every San Francisco
neighborhood and every city department for every piece of evidence.”80 In analyzing the impacts
of highrises on San Francisco, based on original research, the authors describe how:
The supposed economic benefits of skyscrapers have long been virtually a matter of faith to architects,
politicians, businessmen and skyscraper owners. Their argument for viewing San Francisco simply as a
choice piece of real estate to be exploited for private gain runs, in brief, something like this: As we build
more, the city enjoys increased revenues (from property taxes on new buildings), lower taxes for residents,
more jobs, and therefore less crime in the streets, less welfare, etc. What we came up with will not sit well
with the Aliotos [Joseph Alioto was the mayor at the time] and Shorensteins [Walter Shorenstein was a real
estate developer]: 1) Far from “subsidizing” the municipal budget, as claimed by real estate interests, the
downtown highrise district in 1970 actually contributed $5 million less than it cost. 2) Property tax
payments from the downtown, instead of providing relief for homeowners through assessments on
expensive new highrises, actually declined by 16% as a proportion of the city total over the decade of the
skyscraper boom. 3) Head-spinning growth in downtown land values “rippled out” to all San Francisco
neighborhoods, causing assessment increases as high as 380% and leading, in many cases, to destruction of
a neighborhood’s original character. 4) Changing patterns of land-use and other highrise-related
phenomena drove 100,000 middle-income San Franciscans to the suburbs and mauled the city’s delicate
demographic balance. 5) Highrises not only failed to provide new white collar jobs for San Franciscans, but
caused the loss of 14,000 blue collar jobs. 6) Highrises were the prime villains in tripling the city’s welfare
costs over the decade. 7) Transportation facilities to service skyscrapers cost taxpayers a staggering $5
billion over a ten-year period. 8) Police costs for protecting the downtown highrise district averaged at least
ten times the cost for protecting the rest of the city. 9) Highrises caused vast amounts of air and water
pollution which will cost the city close to $1 billion to clean up.81

The above excerpt is worth quoting at length because it contains key questions and provides
concrete answers based on data surrounding what the impacts of highrises are on the existing
city. As shown above, in the beginning of the 1970’s, highrises were actually a financial drain on
the city in several different ways, and highrises had a “ripple out” effect where housing prices
79
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and rents increased.82 Further, during this time, the jobs produced in the highrises did not go to
existing residents, and blue-collar jobs were actually lost.
The unprecedented downtown building explosion and the concerted community response
that took place during the 1960’s, 70’s, and 80’s led to the eventual passage by the city of the
1984 Downtown Plan.83 As described by the Plan itself, it represented a shift in office
construction across Market Street into part of the South of Market.84 As Hartman writes:
the plan really did not limit office growth in San Francisco, but merely shifted it to the South of Market
area...Under the plan, by the year 2000 there would have been 24 million square feet of new office space
built (primarily in the South of Market area), housing 100,000 additional workers...the Plan did far too little
to provide for the housing and transportation needs such growth would generate...What the Planning
Commission approves are buildings to be soon built, whose impacts are soon felt; mitigation measures are
more in the nature of a wish list.85

As a result of community activism, however, other areas surrounding the downtown, as part of
the plan, were rezoned (the Tenderloin, Chinatown, North Beach, and part of the South of
Market below and west of Yerba Buena Center) shortly after the plan’s passage to restrict
commercial development and protect housing, neighborhood serving businesses, and
neighborhood character.86,87,88,89 The 1988 rezoning of the portion of the South of Market
described above, as illustrated in the 1988 South of Market Area Plan, sought to:
Protect and facilitate the expansion of industrial, artisan, home and business service, and neighborhoodserving retail and community service activities. Protect existing economic, social and cultural diversity.
Preserve existing housing and encourage the development of new, affordable housing. Preserve existing
90
amenities and improve neighborhood livability for South of Market residents, workers and visitors.
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To achieve these goals, the area was rezoned to largely restrict office development (and in some
areas housing), with height limits put in place.91
An economic downturn, both regionally and nationally, slowed office construction from
the mid-1980’s through the 1990’s, with “the savings and loans crisis, the state’s real estate
recession, and resultant high financial district vacancy rates stop[ping] the city’s building
boom.”92 The progrowth regime established after WWII effectively collapsed due to a
combination of changes in the national economy, opposition from activists, and the eventual
passage of Proposition M.93 The first dotcom boom that occurred in the late 1990’s, however,
brought about a new round of development and changes to the city, especially in the South of
Market.

Shifting Job Types and the The First Dotcom Boom

Artists...are just bit-players in a major transformation of cities. Those who really orchestrate urban
development have another agenda altogether. Neil Smith and Peter Williams summed it up in 1986: ‘The
direction of change is toward a new central city dominated by middle-class residential areas, a
concentration of professional, administrative, and managerial employment, the upmarket recreation and
entertainment facilities that cater to this population (as well as to tourists) … The moment of the present
restructuring is toward a more peripheralized working class, in geographical terms.’ This is the context
behind multimedia replacing meatpacking in the South of Market.94
- Rebecca Solnit, Hollow City

The period of the 1970’ and 1980’s in San Francisco marked a shift away from industry
towards a new “hourglass economy,” marked by high paid professional and managerial work and
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low paid service sector work.95 In San Francisco, as industry work declined, office work was
growing, “propelled by new technologies in banking, office automation, database systems, and
new communications technologies.”96 The economic downturn of the mid 1980’s marked
another shift in employment types as the city lost major corporate interests in the late
1990’s/early 2000’s that were headquartered there, such as Bank of America, the Transamerica
Corporation, and Chevron.97 This period also saw a marked increase in office vacancy rates,
going from 1-2% in 1982 to 14% by the end of the decade - this vacancy rate only rebounded
with the onset of the dotcom boom, reaching 2% by 2000.98
Prior to the first dotcom boom, the city began the process of looking to turn mid-market
into a Redevelopment Area in order to “bring about social, economic, and physical regeneration
of the whole area,” which included part of the South of Market near Market Street.99 Starting in
1995, the city along with the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency set about creating a plan for
the Redevelopment of Mid-Market. This plan specifically focused on improving the
neighborhood by “adding more housing (including significant affordable housing), retaining
non-profit office space, retaining existing social service agencies, investing in public
improvements to the streetscape, and reinforcing the area as a theater district,” with the plan
eventually calling for 32% affordable housing.100,101 This plan would have departed from
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existing zoning, which “foresaw developing Mid-Market into an extension of the downtown
office zone.”102 While the plan was finalized and ready to pass in 2005, it died in committee
when it went to the Board of Supervisors.103 The subject of regenerating Mid-Market was later
revisited by the city, but it took a different form and came after two successive dotcom booms.
The first expansion in the tech economy, long-brewing in Silicon Valley, arrived in San
Francisco in the late 1990’s, bringing in some 500-700 internet-related companies and an
estimated 55,000 new jobs, located mainly in the South of Market and Mission neighborhoods.104
The boom also brought with it a dramatic increase in office and housing construction. The boom
would add 10 million square feet of new office space, and saw the explosion of live/work loft
construction in the South of Market.105,106 As the internet and the use of computers rapidly
expanded, including online retailing, enormous sums of money began being invested in internet
related companies in San Francisco and the Bay Area, creating a dotcom bubble that began to
build in 1995 and continued to grow until it popped in 2001.107 The result of the dotcom boom
included increased rents, both commercial and residential, and increased displacement. These
realities and the on the ground responses to the first dotcom boom are captured in Rebecca
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Solnit’s book Hollow City: The Siege of San Francisco and the Crisis of American Urbanism,
where Solnit writes:
New businesses are coming in at a hectic pace, and they in turn generate new boutiques, restaurants and
bars that displace earlier businesses, particularly nonprofits, and the new industry’s workers have been
outbidding for rentals and buying houses out from under tenants at a breakneck pace...Evictions have
skyrocketed to make way for the new workers and profiteers of the new industries; at last estimate there
were seven official evictions a day in San Francisco, and 70 percent of those evicted leave the city.108

The dotcom boom saw the rise of evictions under the state Ellis Act (allowing a landlord to go
out of the landlord business and evict all existing tenants) which continue to this day. In 1995
there were 14 apartments that received Ellis Act evictions and by 1999 that number had reached
664.109
Many of the internet companies coming to San Francisco during this time set up shop in
the South of Market, especially in the South Park area that came to be known as “Multimedia
Gulch.”110 Other serious problems began to arise from the dotcom boom in the South of Market,
including illegal and unenforced conversions of industrial space to office use, lack of payment of
linkage fees due to the vagueness of the legal definition of many of these companies as “nonoffice,” and the development of the “live-work lofts” building explosion.111
In terms of demographic changes in the South of Market, from 1980 - 2000 the African
American and Latino populations stayed relatively steady (around 14% and 10% respectively),
while the Asian Pacific Islander population slightly declined (from 30% to 27%) and the white
population increased (from 41% to 44%). In 2000, 83% of the South of Market population were
renters. In 2000, both the adult and senior poverty rates in the South of Market were more than
double the rate in San Francisco, the median household income was $6,000 less than the city
108
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median, and the per capita income was $1,000 higher than the city’s, highlighting the income
disparity that exists within the neighborhood (with per capita income maps from 2000 showing a
wealthier population in the eastern half of SoMa and a lower-income population in the western
half of SoMa).112
As the dotcom boom came to sudden halt in 2001, rents and housing prices momentarily
cooled down. But less than a decade later the technology sector would come back with a
vengeance to San Francisco and the Bay Area.

The Second Technology Boom up to the Present

During the 1990’s and 2000’s, as San Francisco lost large corporate actors, job types
shifted from larger to smaller employers and the financial district saw a decline in employment.
This shift coincided with rising employment and jobs in the South of Market area, with from
1987 - 2008 the financial district losing around 40,000 jobs (mainly in office) and the South of
Market gaining around 40,000 jobs (in cultural, institutional, educational, and office
activities).113
As the dotcom boom came to an end in the early 2000’s (followed by the September 11th
attack in New York), San Francisco’s economy and housing market slumped briefly before a real
estate boom (experienced globally) saw housing prices rise again. During this time, many
industrial buildings in the South of Market (some of which had just been converted to
commercial use) were being converted to residential uses. The Planning Department also began
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implementing plans to develop new housing in Rincon Hill and adjoining areas, in the form of
new highrise luxury condominium towers (several of which have been completed).114
Following the economic crash of 2008, housing construction dropped dramatically in San
Francisco, housing prices dropped by 30%, and the city’s economy was largely stagnant until
2012.115,116 The second technology boom started to pick up around 2010 in San Francisco, with
21,000 tech jobs added between 2010 - 2013 (close to half of all private sector jobs added during
this time).117 In 2015, San Francisco had about 70,000 tech jobs with an average salary of
$175,000.118
City government has also actively courted technology companies to the city, as seen in
the Twitter tax break, which exempted companies from payroll taxes if they located in the MidMarket area.119 This tax break targeted the Mid-Market area (previously discussed as a possible
Redevelopment Area) and looked almost exclusively to technology companies to “revitalize” the
area. Passed in 2011 and adopted in 2012, the legislation has worked to attract technology
companies and condo developers, all in the name of economic development. This is in sharp
contrast to the proposed 2005 Mid-Market Redevelopment plan which sought to regenerate the
area by focusing on the arts and increased affordable housing - not tech and market-rate condos.
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The technology boom has seen a rise in both residential and commercial construction.
From a low of less than 500 new residential units constructed in 2011, San Francisco has seen a
rapid increase in new housing production, reaching a high of close to 3,500 new units
constructed in 2014.120 In 2015, there were 12.5 million square feet of new office projects
seeking approval, and in 2016 there was about 5 million square feet of office space under
construction.121,122 The majority of new residential development has occurred in the eastern half
of the city, including the South of Market.123,124 Nearly all of the recently completed, under
construction, and proposed office buildings are located in the South of Market.125,126
The second technology boom in San Francisco has brought tremendous amounts of
capital to the city, resulting in increased rents, housing prices, and general cost of living, with in
2016 the median rent for a 1-bedroom apartment being $3,590 and the median housing price
being $1.1 million (compared to around $660,000 in 2012).127,128 This influx of capital has also
meant increased evictions and displacement, with the number of evictions increasing every year
since 2010.129 Evictions in San Francisco are at the highest point in over a decade, with nearly
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2,400 evictions filed in 2016 (though the actual number is higher due to unreported
evictions).130,131 It was also found that between 2011 - 2013, 69% of no-fault evictions occurred
within four blocks of a tech shuttle bus stop.132 The technology boom has also seen a sharp
increase in income inequality in San Francisco, with in 2015 San Francisco reaching the spot of
second most unequal city in the United States in terms of income disparity.133
During the period of 2010 - 2015, San Francisco experienced a huge inversion of
population based on race and class - during this period the city saw a direct reversal and decline
in low-income people of color (specifically African Americans and Latinos) and an increase in
higher-income mainly white populations (in addition to an increase in the Asian population).134
Looking at American Community Survey data from 2010 and 2015 through Social Explorer (an
online mapping tool), during this five year period in the South of Market there was decline in the
African American population and a sharp increase in per-capita incomes (the largest increase
seen in the eastern half of the South of Market was from $88,000 to $114,000 during this time)
(see Figs. 2, 3, 4, 5). The data further shows that there is still a large population of adults living
in poverty in the western portion of the South of Market (See Figs. 6, 7).135
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Part I: Conclusion

This section offered a brief social and economic history of the South of Market, up to
present time. While the South of Market historically has been a working class and blue-collar
neighborhood, changes, especially since the post-WWII period, have attempted to restructure the
area in the image of a financial and business center - large office buildings, a convention center,
and largely high-end housing. More recently, the first and especially the second technology
booms have given new life to development forces that went dormant in the 1980’s. This has
worked to fuel a new round of high end development (primarily in offices and housing) in the
South of Market. Recently, demographic trends in San Francisco have indicated that low-income
people of color have been exiting San Francisco and a primarily wealthier white population is
coming in. In terms of the South of Market, this trend also seems to be holding true, although
there are still large concentrations of poverty in the South of Market (while per-capita incomes
are skyrocketing in other areas of the neighborhood).
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Part 2: The Role of Urban Planning and Area Plans in San Francisco

This section will provide an overview of the role of urban planning and specifically “area
plans” in shaping San Francisco. First, a brief history of urban planning in the United States will
be explored. This is followed by a history of the creation and role of area plans in San Francisco.
Next, three existing area plans will be analyzed - The Downtown Plan, The Eastern
Neighborhoods Plan, and the Western SoMa Community Plan. Themes explored in the analysis
of these area plans include what gave rise to the plans, what is the history of the development of
the plans, what were the plans intended to do, and what were the results of the plans? By
analyzing existing area plans and the implications of their implementation, an argument will be
made in the next section about the implications of adopting the Central SoMa Plan in light of
these existing area plans.

A Brief History of Urban Planning in the United States

The institution of urban planning in the United States came about largely in response to
public concerns over the social and economic conditions brought on by industrialization in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries, beginning as a loose affiliation of architects, politicians, and
public health officials. It was during this time that urban planning became professionalized and
expanded to include economists, sociologists, geographers, and lawyers.136
Coming on the heels of sanitary reform in cities, the “city beautiful movement” began at
the turn of the 19th century and sought to bring art and civic improvements to localities in order
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to meet the demand for beauty, order, and cleanliness.137 By 1915 this movement had waned, and
between the period of 1915 - 1945 the professionalization of urban planning was further
solidified.138 As described by Krueckeberg, this was a period of “nationalizing and standardizing
the planning movement and many of its inventions: zoning, the master plan, the planning
commission, neighborhood design, public housing, the planning process, and state and federal
roles.”139
Following WWII, four major national programs largely shaped urban planning and gave
way to post-war suburbanization (sprawl) and urbanization patterns. These programs included
public housing, urban renewal, home mortgage insurance, and highway building.140
The decades of the 1970’s and 1980’s began to see a reversal of urban planning trends.
Ideas in urban planning of regulating urban space through the guidance and control of growth
(which had always been weaker in the United States than in other parts of the world) began to
give way to ideas of actively promoting growth at any cost necessary. As deindustrialization took
hold and neoconservative forces began to restructure the postwar Keynesian policies of the social
welfare state, the regulatory role of urban planning also came under attack as inhibiting market
forces. These changes took the form of “urban revitalization” programs that looked to “creative
partnerships” between city governments and the private sector.141
Continuing into the 1990’s, this attack on traditional land-use planning, coupled with the
political and economic environment, created a situation in urban planning where, according to
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Peter Hall, it “became determinedly reactive, artisan, and anti-intellectual...Meanwhile, it faced a
new range of problems, with which its practitioners were never equipped by education (and
perhaps by inclination) to tackle: the problem of structural economic decline of whole urban
economies and of rebuilding a new economy on the ruins of the old.”142 The period of the 1990’s
also saw the emergence of the idea of sustainable urban development, where by the profession of
urban planning largely subscribes to the notion that such sustainable development is possible
without impeding economic growth.143
Reflecting on the attack of the traditional role of land-use planning, Hall writes:
Will planning die away, then? Not entirely. Planning will survive, because in every advanced country it has
a large - and in the long run, increasing - political constituency...in very advanced post-industrial societies South East England, the San Francisco Bay Area - the politics of planning become ever more complex, ever
more protracted, ever more bitter.144

History of Area Plans in San Francisco

An important feature in the story of urban planning, land use, and development in San
Francisco, especially for the South of Market and the larger eastern portion of the city, is the
creation of “specific area plans” (here referred to as “area plans”). Area plans represented a shift
in the type of planning being undertaken in San Francisco.
In 1979, an amendment to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) formalized
the concept of an area plan, where city governments were given the ability to move away from
site-by-site rezoning and development towards neighborhood wide rezoning and development.145
This works to streamline development by exempting any new developments within the
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designated area plan from environmental review as long as the development meets the policies
and regulations outlined in the area plan.146 Individual developments are normally required to
undergo an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) that details the potential environmental impacts
of the new development (such as impacts on traffic and air quality). However, under an adopted
area plan, individual developments are exempted from this process. Before adoption, all area
plans are required to undergo a neighborhood-level EIR that covers the entire plan area. Once
adopted, all area plans are made part of the city’s General Plan.
As discussed by the Board of Supervisors’ Legislative Analyst, “Specific area planning
allows local governments to formulate plans for neighborhood-wide development...This
approach can also be used to build consensus through public involvement prior to development,
allowing development to take place smoothly once developers commit to specific projects.”147
The logic is that area plans are supposed to be detailed and comprehensive and reflect the needs
of both residents and developers. This is supposed to be achieved by a planning process that
engages the public, public officials, and private developers, reflected in an area plan that
balances these different interests.148 The concepts of certainty, streamlining development, and
having a smooth development process are central to area plans.
Area plans are also seen as a way to incorporate community planning into the official
planning process, with a 2001 Legislative Analyst report stating “Community based planning is
an evolution and reinvention of traditional planning, particularly specific area plan
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development.”149 The role of public outreach and participation in area plans is described by the
city as a way of preventing future opposition to development and helping facilitate a more
financially secure process for developers. As described by a 2003 Legislative Analyst report
speaking about area plans:
If a neighborhood-level EIR is funded, developers will have the advantage of greater certainty about
development costs. Developers will save a significant amount of time and money by knowing that an EIR
has been completed. Furthermore, they will know that extensive community outreach has already taken
place, and that the community is generally supportive of the neighborhood plan. This will reduce the
probability of a project being held up through appeals and permit approval problems.150

This motive for public input and participation is premised first as a means of streamlining
development for developers by reducing outside input, and premised only second as a genuine
means of reaching out to the public to gain community insight as to what the planning process
and resultant development should be. As described by Tim Colen, the senior advisor and former
executive director of the San Francisco Housing Action Committee (an organization that
advocates for building more housing in San Francisco), “The thinking was that if we do area
plans, we do an EIR, and you study it, and you do lots and lots and lots of community hearings,
and public presentations at the planning commission, and rec. and park maybe, and other
commissions as needed, you start to achieve the buy-in necessary to allow the rezoning.”151
These comments further highlight the way in which public outreach is done primarily to gain
“buy-in” of the public to accept the plan, rather than as a way to genuinely include the public in
the planning process.
As the Central SoMa Plan currently enters the stage of finalizing the EIR and then
moving on to adoption and incorporation of the plan into the city’s General Plan, it is important
to look back at the history of existing area plans. What gave rise to these plans and what has been
149
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the outcome? Do the stated goals reflect the realities of development and change that occurred?
By looking back at specific case studies of existing area plans, a sense of what works and what
does not work can be gained in order to help guide an understanding of what the larger
implications of the Central SoMa Plan are.

The Downtown Plan

One of the early area plans created by the city of San Francisco was the Downtown Plan
(See Figs. 8, 9). Adopted in 1984, the Downtown Plan and the resulting rezoning must be
understood in its historical context to fully grasp what exactly gave rise to the plan and what it
was intended to do.
Following the explosion in downtown development after WWII, early challenges to this
type of development took root in places like the San Francisco Bay Guardian as well as Alvin
Duskin’s 1971 and 1972 initiative campaigns (regarding height limits). A permanent and rooted
slow-growth movement was formed surrounding the wide-ranging coalition that came together
to elect progressive George Moscone as mayor in 1975. This slow-growth movement, or
“balanced growth” movement as it stressed the need for housing and transit to meet the needs of
new development, was able to carry the momentum through the death of Moscone and put
several slow-growth initiatives on the ballot starting with Proposition O in 1979, and culminating
in the successful passage of Proposition M in 1986.152
The strong showing (though it lost) of Proposition O in 1979, which sought to reduce
height and bulk limits, prompted the City in 1980 to agree to do an EIR analyzing the effects of
downtown growth on jobs, housing, transit, and the physical environment. After two and a half
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years, the Planning Director at the time decided to redefine the document (which had showed the
negative effects of unchecked downtown development) as a consultant’s report to be used to
develop a “downtown plan,” therefore ensuring the EIR would have no legal standing (resulting
in the downplaying of the EIR).153 In the meantime, beginning in 1981, the city started requiring
mandated mitigation fees for transit and housing for new developments that “clarified the rules
of the game, reduced uncertainty, and insulated developers from political pressures for additional
concessions.”154 The slow-growth forces moved ahead with a 1983 ballot measure, Proposition
M, which sought to “revise the city’s Master Plan to achieve internal consistency among the
various plan elements…[and assign] precedence to the preservation and protection of
neighborhoods, small businesses, and ethnic and cultural diversity” through a list of “priority
policies,” greatly challenging the rapid growth of development in San Francisco.155 The pressure
that mounted from this campaign (as well as the proposition nearly winning with 49.4% of the
vote) prompted the Planning Director at the time to unveil the Downtown Plan three months
before the 1983 November election, giving the impression to the public that the City was acting
on its own to address the problems associated with growth in San Francisco.156
The Downtown Plan focused on the urban design of buildings (opting for slimmer,
shorter highrises and banning “refrigerator box” designs), architectural preservation (allowing
for the “transfer of development rights” or TDRs), and the implementation of new (childcare and
open space) and existing (transit and housing) linkage fees. The Plan also included an annual
limit on office construction (for buildings of 50,000 square feet or more) to 950,000 square feet
per year which was set to expire after three years, excluding buildings that were in the
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development pipeline (waiting for approval, approved, or under construction).157 The Planning
Director had pushed the plan as a growth limitation measure, but in actuality it did little to that
end. As explicitly stated by the plan itself, it shifted new development from the financial district
to part of the South of Market, while at the same time limiting growth in the Tenderloin,
Chinatown, North Beach, and South of Market below and west of Yerba Buena Center. It further
projected a growth rate of new office space that met 83% of the rate of growth from 1965-1981
in San Francisco, and failed to address housing and transportation needs associated with the
projected office growth.158
At the time of its passage, the Downtown Plan was nationally acclaimed for its new
approach to urban design, even making the front page of the New York Times.159 Downtown
business leaders came to accept the plan as it allowed for continued development while at the
same time having the appearance of appeasing social activists. As described by DeLeon:
[Business leaders] could tolerate the temporary growth limits during a period of glut in the supply of office
space. Besides, the pipeline was packed and would continue to disgorge new office buildings without
restriction. The exemption of smaller buildings…and the wide open spaces outside the downtown office
district all gave developers considerable flexibility…What business leaders liked most about the
Downtown Plan were precisely those features that slow-growth critics hated. The growth limits were only
temporary...The plan applied mainly to downtown and placed few if any restrictions on development
elsewhere in the city...No provision was made to enforce consistency among Master Plan elements or to
formulate development planning priorities.160

The subsequent passage of Proposition M in 1986 created further changes to the
Downtown Plan as slow-growth forces sought to regulate downtown growth. Proposition M
implemented a citywide limit on office construction (limiting office construction to 950,000
square feet annually, with a portion of this reserved for smaller buildings, and a limit of 475,000
square feet per year in new permits until the construction backlog disappeared to address the
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buildup in pipeline developments), required voter approval for large-scale projects that sought an
exemption to the limit, and incorporated eight priority policies (in large part carried over from
the 1983 Proposition M measure) into the existing Master Plan.161 As DeLeon writes:
Parts of the policy were precise...the numerical limits on high-rise office construction, for example...Other
parts of the plan, however, were considerably more vague and open-ended. The list of eight ‘priority
policies,’ for example, broadly prescribed the ‘preservation’ or ‘enhancement’ of certain values, such as
neighborhood diversity and affordable housing. It was left to the planners to define these goals more
exactly and to decide, when, where, how, and how much to convert them into action and results.162

As discussed earlier, community activism also prompted the Planning Department, as
part of the creation of the Downtown Plan, to implement rezonings of the areas surrounding the
downtown (the Tenderloin, Chinatown, North Beach, and part of the South of Market below and
west of Yerba Buena Center) in order to protect existing housing, neighborhood businesses, and
neighborhood character by limiting office construction.
An economic downturn in the mid 1980’s both regionally and nationally coincided with
reduced growth pressure and reduced development. This all picked up again, however, in the late
1990’s with the first dotcom boom.
Since the plan’s adoption in 1984, the San Francisco Planning Department has largely
considered the plan a “success,” regarding improvements to “job and housing density, retail
activity and overall character of the downtown.”163 The plan shifted new commercial
development to the South of Market as intended, with by 2009 having some 18.7 million new
square feet of commercial space added in the plan area (75% of it was offices), the majority in
the South of Market, and another 7.5 million square feet in areas nearby (primarily in the South
of Market). The plan had envisioned a series of increasingly dense residential neighborhoods
surrounding the downtown area, and according to the 1985 - 2009 Monitoring Report, “the Plan
161
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sought to build between 1,000 and 1,500 new units annually citywide...San Francisco housing
production averaged over 1,670 units annually since 1985, exceeding the Downtown Plan’s goal
for new housing construction.” The vast majority of this new housing was in the larger South of
Market area, and only 18% of new housing units produced during this time were affordable.164
There were similar trends in 2015, with 6.4 million square feet of commercial space in
the pipeline in the plan area (80% of which is office), and with housing production across the
city reaching 3,500 units in 2014 and 3,000 units in 2015 (with only 17% of new units in 2015
being affordable housing).165,166 Between 2011-2015, a third of new housing units constructed
were located in the plan area and the nearby “Downtown Residential District” in the eastern
portion of the South of Market, and another 12,000 housing units were in the pipeline for these
areas.167
While the Planning Department largely considers the plan a success, other indicators
imply that the plan has been a failure. The 2015 Downtown Monitoring Report describes that:
In order to accommodate this growth, the Plan contains a series of goals, policies and targets designed to
ensure that new development is supported with the infrastructure and services required of great
places...without sufficient and appropriate housing to serve new commercial development, local housing
costs would increase, thereby compromising the vitality of downtown. The Plan also states that if
employment growth increases the number of cars downtown, thereby significantly increasing traffic, the
area’s attractiveness and livability could be affected adversely.168

As a result of the plan, commercial and residential development has proceeded. Yet, affordable
housing has not kept pace and the majority of new housing is market-rate. Further, the plan has
not done anything to keep housing prices from rising. Transportation infrastructure also has not
been able to keep up with downtown development. In 2015, the Muni Metro (train) lines reached
125% of full capacity during peak hours, and from 2010-2015 for the San Francisco
164
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neighborhoods outside of downtown and the South of Market, transit demand increased by 26%
while the capacity for new transit riders going to downtown/South of Market (via Muni, BART,
Caltrain, and SamTrans) grew by only 6%.169 Automobile congestion is also extremely bad in
Downtown San Francisco.170,171 The new “open spaces” produced under the plan have largely
been privatized open spaces, known as “Privately Owned Public Open Spaces,” that do not
operate the same ways as publicly operated open spaces.172,173 Height limits are also routinely
changed on a case by case basis for new developments, allowing for taller buildings through
exemptions to the plan.174 The rezonings of surrounding neighborhoods as result of community
activism and as a part of the Downtown Plan, however, can be seen as a huge success of the
Downtown Plan. This aspect of the plan, however, is being undermined by the rezoning to occur
under the Central SoMa Plan.

The Eastern Neighborhoods Plan

The Eastern Neighborhoods Plan was adopted in late 2008 by the Board of Supervisors
and signed by the mayor, becoming effective in early 2009. The area plan covers and rezones the
areas of East SoMa, the Mission, Showplace Square/Potrero, and the Central Waterfront (see
Figs. 10, 11). The plan’s stated goals are stabilizing and preserving production, distribution, and
repair (PDR) uses, providing new housing at all income levels, and creating “complete
169
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neighborhoods” (transportation, open space, community facilities) by providing amenities for
new residents.175 As described by the planning department’s senior policy analyst in 2002, the
idea is to come up with a “smart growth plan to permanently shape the neighborhoods...We're
trying to find the right balance and right mix that will work for residents and businesses of San
Francisco.”176 The plan rezoned many areas that were primarily previously zoned for industry as
urban-mixed-use (allowing for residential and commercial developments), called for a 15%
affordable housing requirement (per the city’s existing Affordable Housing Program), and
implemented a community improvement fee ($6 per square foot for residential and $8 per square
foot for commercial). The plan’s rezoning resulted in the loss of 2 million square feet of area
dedicated to industrial land uses and allowed for a potential of 7,500 - 10,000 new housing
units.177
Planning for the areas that eventually became the larger “Eastern Neighborhoods”
originally grew from concerns of community organizers, especially the Mission AntiDisplacement Coalition (MAC), reacting to the recent first dotcom boom, which caused
increased rents and displacement and loss of industrial uses, residents, small businesses, and
affordable housing.178,179 Meeting with a progressive newly elected board of supervisors (elected
in 2000), organizers set about preparing interim zoning controls (passed in 2001) for many of the
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Eastern Neighborhoods that were impacted by the influx of people and capital during the dotcom
boom, where existing zoning had not been being enforced.180,181,182
During this time, organizers in the Eastern Neighborhoods, especially the Mission and
especially MAC, worked to open-up the planning process of the planning department’s efforts to
rezone the Eastern Neighborhoods. MAC ran their own parallel community planning workshops,
engaged in direct actions targeting the planning department, made the planning meetings
culturally relevant (by providing language translation, food, and childcare), and organized
members of the community to partake in the public planning process led by the planning
department.183 As the planning process continued through the 2000s, initial neighborhood
support waned and tensions between MAC and the planning department greatly lessened. The
planning department meanwhile continued attempts to engage the public through mailed
questionnaires, telephone interviews, focus groups, informational meetings, and community
workshops.184 MAC was successful in shifting official city planning focus to better realize issues
regarding affordable housing, cultural values, and neighborhood assets; further, MAC eventually
produced their own “People’s Plan” that influenced the final adopted version of the city’s
Eastern Neighborhoods Plan.185 Prior to adoption of the Eastern Neighborhoods Plan in 2008,
many community organizations and residents, including MAC, were rallying against the plan,
with one member of the community organization the South of Market Community Action
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Network stating “I’ve been working on the Eastern Neighborhood's plans for 7 1/2 years. I'm
also a resident of SOMA. (South of Market Area), they've really butchered the community input
and translated it into the developer's language.”186
Before the Eastern Neighborhoods Plan was adopted, temporary zoning policies were put
in place by the planning commission that were in line with the priorities of the pending plan and
allowed for new housing development.187 Thus, while the area plan was not yet in effect, new
development was still occurring. The plan was originally several separate area plans that
eventually became combined into one large area plan (the Eastern Neighborhoods Plan) subject
to one EIR. Before the process was initiated to perform an EIR for the areas now designated
under the Eastern Neighborhoods Plan, separate area plans were being drawn up for the Central
Waterfront (under the Better Neighborhoods Plan) and the Mission, South of Market, Showplace
Square/Potrero Hill, and Bayview Hunters Point (under the efforts discussed above regarding the
planning department and MAC, as is reflected in the 2003 city report “Community Planning in
the Eastern Neighborhoods Rezoning Options Workbook Draft”).188,189
Then in 2006, MAC challenged a development project at 2660 Harrison Street in the
Mission that sought to rezone land from industrial to residential for some 68 condo units that had
been exempted from doing an EIR. MAC argued that an EIR was necessary to understand the
full impacts of the development in relation to housing (especially affordable housing) and jobs
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(especially blue-collar PDR jobs). The Board of Supervisors upheld the appeal and required that
the development at 2660 Mission Street and all similar developments in the Eastern
Neighborhoods areas each individually undergo an EIR before they are approved, ultimately
creating a moratorium on new residential development in the Eastern Neighborhoods.190 This
caused an immediate potential delay in some 52 housing projects representing some 4,600 units
in the Eastern Neighborhoods.191
To overcome this development roadblock, the ongoing planning efforts in the Mission,
East SoMa, Showplace Square/Potrero Hill, and Central Waterfront were combined into one
large plan/“project area,” the Eastern Neighborhoods Plan (though each of the four
neighborhoods would receive its own specific area plan to be incorporated into the General
Plan), to be approved via the completion and approval of a neighborhood-level EIR.192 As Tony
Kelly, an arts director and community activist in the Potrero neighborhood, explains, “They [the
planning department] didn’t go in saying ‘let’s rezone 25% of the city and do it all at once.’ No,
they had to and they had to do it as fast as they possibly could to get over the hurdle of this
moratorium...the need to pass it [the Eastern Neighborhoods Plan] was because otherwise no one
makes any money on development.”193 Other areas in the Eastern Neighborhoods that were
earlier being studied by the planning department for rezoning shifted into planning under the
Redevelopment Agency (Bayview Hunters Point and Visitacion Valley) as well as community
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planning efforts (The Western SoMa Community Plan).194 The Draft EIR was completed in June
2007 and the final EIR was completed in August 2008 prior to adoption of the Eastern
Neighborhoods Plan.
The main goals of the plan, as stated by the plan itself, of protecting PDR, providing
housing for all incomes, and creating “complete communities” through infrastructure and open
space improvements have largely failed. As Kelly states, “We are talking today essentially about
the post-mortem of an Eastern Neighborhoods Plan that is essentially full and failed to do what it
was supposed to do.”195 As seen in the 2011 - 2015 Eastern Neighborhoods Plan Monitoring
Report (the time of greatest growth since the implementation of the plan as stated by the report),
nearly 1 million square feet of PDR has been lost (mainly to residential conversions) with
another 1.3 million set to be lost through pipeline projects as of 2015.196 1,310 new housing units
have been constructed (19% have been affordable housing) with another 10,340 units in the
pipeline, compared to a max build out scenario (as identified by the Eastern Neighborhoods Plan
EIR) of 9,800 new units by 2025, thus reaching the new housing unit mark in less than half the
time anticipated.197,198 915,335 square feet of office space has been added with another 1.9
million square feet in the pipeline.199 Infrastructure (transit, open space, childcare facilities) has
not kept up with development, with impact fees unable to provide the funds necessary for
194
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improvements.200,201 As admitted by the Planning Department, “Impact fees created through the
Area Plans are a major source of revenue for infrastructure spending although they were never
expected to provide 100% of funding for needed community improvements. Planning staff
anticipated impact fees to pay for 30% of infrastructure need created by new development.”202
Further, the Planning Department states that “Although impact fees are an important resource,
they are reliant on the timing of development, which can be unpredictable and ‘lumpy.’
Implementing agencies are careful not to plan projects solely around irregular funding
sources...As such, infrastructure projects reliant on impact fees often lag behind the development
they are intended to serve.”203 As of 2016, of 50 infrastructure projects that were projected to be
needed over a 20 year period (that addressed open space, streetscape, transit, bicycle and
pedestrian improvements), only five have been completed, representing an achievement of only
20% of anticipated projects in close to half the projected time period.204

The Western SoMa Community Plan

In the early 2000s, when the planning department was undertaking various planning
processes in the Eastern Neighborhoods of San Francisco, residents in the western part of South
of Market, led by resident and planning activist Jim Meko, broke off and started their own
independent, grassroots, community-based planning process for the area.205 As reported by the
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former San Francisco Bay Guardian newspaper, Meko is quoted saying that “A lot of us were
offended by the Planning Department’s top-down, autocratic process,” fearing that the Eastern
Neighborhoods Plan would impose a “one-size-fits-all mode that treated all of SoMa like post
industrial wasteland.”206 Paul Lord, the former Planning Department project manager for the
Western SoMa Community Plan, affirmed this description in his own recollections about the
early phases of the Eastern Neighborhoods Plan:
[The Planning Department] would hold these community meetings and say ok community what do you
want? Or what do you think you need here or how can we solve this problem. And the community would
lay out a list of recommendations, wish list, ideas that they wanted, and then they would come to the next
meeting and none of that stuff would appear and the Planning Department would be presenting a whole
new proposal that didn’t embrace any of those ideas that they’d asked for from the community before.207

In November 2004, the Board of Supervisors officially removed Western SoMa from the
larger Eastern Neighborhoods Planning process, and the “Western SoMa Citizens Planning
Taskforce” (made up of 26 members) was created to advise the Board of Supervisors and the
Planning Commission on planning in West SoMa.208,209
The Taskforce released a “Values Statement” in 2005, as seen in the Western SoMa Plan,
that read:
The Western SoMa Citizens Planning Task Force shall promote neighborhood qualities and scale that
maintain and enhance, rather than destroy, today’s living, historic and sustainable neighborhood character
of social, cultural and economic diversity, while integrating appropriate land use, transportation and design
opportunities into equitable, evolving and complete neighborhoods. Throughout the life of this Task Force,
the membership shall respect one another, be responsive to the constituencies they represent and foster a
citizen-based democratic decision-making process.210

The Taskforce and the Western SoMa Community Plan worked to introduce new community
focused aspects into neighborhood planning. These included initial planning principles
206
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developed by the taskforce that reflected the needs of the whole community (safety and the
public welfare; social heritage preservation; economic and workforce development; sustainable
growth management programs) that were later adopted by the larger Eastern Neighborhoods
planning process as the notion of developing “complete communities.” Other community
focused aspects included collaborations with the Department of Public Health throughout the
development of the plan that included applying a “Healthy Measurement Development Tool,” as
well as an unprecedented level of community engagement and involvement.211
Speaking about the influence of the Western SoMa Community Plan on the larger
planning department, Lord describes how the concept of cultural districts (as developed by the
community plan specifically for the Filipino and LGBTQ communities) “now is being imitated
by the Planning Department in the Mission, being imitated with ‘legacy businesses,’ it’s being
imitated in a lot of different ways. But those were all ideas that we cultivated and developed and
formalized in the Western SoMa and now they’re starting to spread.”212 Another unique aspect of
the plan included a collaboration with the public health department to develop a “health impact
assessment” that would help guide the creation of the plan. As Lord describes:
We had a very progressive department of public health for a while, that put in place some very interesting
ideas that were much more institutionalized in Canada called ‘health impact assessments.’ Health impact
assessments said let’s look at what is going to happen if you build out the community the way that you’ve
envisioned it. How far are people going to have to go for a place to exercise, for a place to have quiet, for a
place to find good food as opposed to ‘let's go have burger king.’ So all these sorts of things were figured
in: exercise, walkability, access to food, access to air, access to quiet. All these things were considered as
health impact assessments. The Western SoMa Plan was the only plan in the city’s history to have gone
through a full blown health impact assessment based on the proposal and then be modified to further meet
the health impact indexes associated with those assessments that were developed by Rajid Bhatia and the
Health Department and some of his staff before he was forced out by Mayor Ed Lee...We wanted to get
housing away from the freeway noise, get it away from the highway...We had to deal with ‘how are we
going to get the kids to Bessie Carmichael [Middle] School from these new housing projects without them
getting murtilated on Folsom Street with high speed traffic?’ We considered all those things.213
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The Taskforce, which met frequently, especially in the early phases of the plan,
developed several committees to oversee various aspects of the plan.214 The plan ultimately was
the result of hundreds of hours of committee meetings and has been vetted by three Town Hall
meetings.”215 As detailed in the Western SoMa Community Plan:
Long-time residents and newcomers to the neighborhood, market-rate developers, non-profit housing
providers, tenants rights activists, community-Based organizations, SRO hotel residents, small business
owners, artists, organized labor, transportation, public health and urban planners and advocates for the
disabled, youth, pedestrians and bicyclists, parks and open space, preservation and the entertainment
industry have all contributed to the process.216

Further, as Lord explains, “They [the community] were setting the agenda. They were saying we
want to explore this idea, and then say ‘figure it out Paul and come back with some proposals,’
and I’d come back with three or four proposals and they’d go ‘we like this one, we don’t like this
one, we’ll go with this but we want to make these changes to it,’ and then we’d start to go down
that road. It was a totally different process [than other area plans]. So it really was
empowering.”217
The plan was completed and adopted as part of the city’s General Plan in 2013 (see Figs.
12, 13). The plan’s rezoning generally allows for increased office and residential uses. The plan
allows new residential and resident-serving uses north of Harrison Street, and local and regional
job producing uses south of Harrison Street.218 Areas zoned exclusively for PDR uses were
largely retained (except for a stretch on Townsend Street). Office uses are allowed, but in
specific designated areas (smaller office uses on 9th, 10th, and Folsom Streets and larger office
uses along Townsend Street).219,220,221
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The plan projected that it would accommodate 2,767 new housing units by the year
2030.222 Since the implementation of the plan, sixty new housing units have been added (8%
have been affordable housing) with another 1,288 units in the pipeline (about 8% to be
affordable housing), thus reaching close to half of the planned housing units.223 Also since
implementation, PDR space has declined by 87,220 square feet, with another 110,766 square feet
to be lost due to pipeline projects. Since implementation, the area has seen an increase in 83,276
square feet of office space, with an additional 3,046,022 square feet in the pipeline (though this
is all located in the Central SoMa Plan area that is to be rezoned to allow offices).224
The outcomes so far of the Western SoMa Community Plan are unclear. Very little
affordable housing is being produced and PDR space is being lost (though it is unclear if the
PDR space that could be lost due to pipeline development is a result of new development that is
set to occur under the Central SoMa Plan rezoning). Since the plan was passed in 2013, much of
the new development is still in the pipeline. And with the creation and probable passage of the
Central SoMa Plan which rezones close to half of the area in the Western SoMa Community Plan
(areas that are mostly zoned for PDR), the plan in general is being overridden by the Planning
Department. The part of the Western SoMa Community Plan that is being rezoned (again) under
the Central SoMa Plan is the portion that had what planners call the largest “development
potential,” yet the preservation of this area as mainly for PDR (and arts and nightlife uses) was
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an integral part of the Western SoMa Community Plan (including the exclusion of housing in
this area).225,226 The impact fee used for the plan area was rolled over from the existing Western
SoMa Special Use District Impact Fee (that existed before the implementation of the Western
SoMa Community Plan) and incorporated into the larger Eastern Neighborhoods Community
Benefits Fund, indicating that this fee, like the larger Eastern Neighborhoods Impact Fee, will be
insufficient to meet the infrastructure needs associated with the increased development.227
Other aspects involving the actual development of the plan and some of the new concepts
and proposals made by the plan, however, can be seen as successes. This includes empowering
residents through a bottom-up planning structure, developing the notion of “complete
communities,” developing the structure for future community cultural districts, and using the
“health impact assessment” to guide the creation of the plan (this practice was not adopted by the
Planning Department; however, a Sustainable Communities Health Assessment was conducted
by the Department of Public Health at the request of the Planning Department for the initial draft
of the Central SoMa Plan, then referred to as the Central Corridor Plan).
Another interesting aspect about the development of the Western SoMa Community Plan
is that those developing the plan unsuccessfully tried to get what community planners called
“boom proof zoning” incorporated into the plan. Boom proof zoning, inspired by 1986
Proposition M, would have worked by identifying the current mix of land uses by type, size, and
income (such as current levels of affordable housing and market-rate housing and size of the
housing) and would have required developers to meet existing proportions in new development
in order to proceed with the development. This would work to prevent one new type of use to
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dominate new development and would work to preserve the existing proportions of land uses.
For instance, in the area of the South of Market covered under the Western SoMa Community
Plan, those developing the plan found that the area had a high proportion of existing affordable
housing, so boom proof zoning would have ensured that new development would have reflected
the existing housing stock.228

Part 2: Conclusion

This section looked at the history and development of urban planning in the United States
and more specifically of area plans in San Francisco. Area plans in San Francisco, which
generally work to streamline new development, were analyzed by looking at three existing cases
of adopted plans - The Downtown Plan, the Eastern Neighborhoods Plan, and the Western SoMa
Community Plan. In general, all of the plans achieved the primary goals of adding new housing
and office space (though this goal was less pronounced in the Western SoMa Community Plan).
Yet, other major goals of the plans have not been met. These include failing to stabilize and
protect existing PDR space (in the Eastern Neighborhoods Plan and the Western SoMa
Community Plan), failing to provide housing at various income levels (the majority of housing
that was built under the plans was market-rate), and failing to provide the infrastructure
necessary to meet the population demands of new development. Major questions that come up
when analyzing existing area plans include development for who and for what? What type of
jobs is San Francisco creating and who can access those jobs? What type of housing is San
Francisco creating and who can access that housing? In the meantime, what existing uses are
being displaced? In general, San Francisco appears to be developing for a wealthier, high228
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earning, higher-educated, and more racially homogenous group of people - largely at the expense
of existing blue-collar jobs, working class residents, and low-income communities.
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Part 3: The Central SoMa Plan

This section analyzes and discusses the Central SoMa Plan and offers a critique of the
plan and its possible effects based on details from the plan itself as well as insight gained from
the three existing area plans previously analyzed. First, the main aims and goals of the plan will
be discussed along with the background surrounding the development of the plan. This will
include looking into the development of the Central Subway project, one of the core drivers of
the plan. This is followed by a critique of the plan, specifically focusing on the topics of land
use, jobs, housing, displacement, Prop M, public benefits, funding sources, and public outreach
and engagement. Then, the three previously analyzed area plans will be discussed in relation to
the Central SoMa Plan.

Description and Background

The Central SoMa Plan (formerly the Central Corridor Plan) is a proposed area plan that
aims to rezone largely industrial areas in the South of Market to allow primarily for offices and
also housing over the next 25 years (see Figs. 14, 15, 16, 17).229 The plan will allow for over 10
million square feet of new office space under the rezoning in the next 20 years.230 Specifically,
the scope of the plan is described as follows:
The vision of the Central SoMa Plan is to create a sustainable neighborhood by 2040, where the needs of
the present are met without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The
Central SoMa Plan seeks to achieve sustainability in each of its aspects – social, economic, and
environmental. Additionally, achieving sustainability in Central SoMa should complement movements
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towards sustainability in the city, region, nation, and planet...Achieving neighborhood sustainability
requires keeping what is already successful about the neighborhood, and improving what is not.231

Largely based on the concept of “transit oriented development” (TOD), the idea that building
housing and commercial space near transit will reduce driving and therefore greenhouse gas
emissions, the plan calls for “accommodating growth” while at the same time providing public
benefits and “respecting the neighborhood character.”232 The plan builds on the regional smart
growth plan, Plan Bay Area, which focuses on reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the Bay
Area through implementing TOD in select “priority development areas,” which in San Francisco
are located almost exclusively on the Eastern side of the city in working class neighborhoods and
neighborhoods of color.233,234,235
The planning process for the Central SoMa Plan began in 2011 (as the economy was
recovering from the recession) and builds upon what planners refer to as the “development
potential” of the industrially zoned areas of the South of Market as well as the creation of the
Central Subway. The plan is overlaid on two existing plans, the Western SoMa Community Plan
and the Eastern SoMa Plan, and rezones portions of those areas. The Central SoMa Plan calls for
adding 45,000 jobs and 7,800 new housing units, while at the same time retaining a small area
zoned for PDR. A large impetus for the plan was the construction of the Central Subway line
(still underway) which will extend the T-Line to connect with the Caltrain station through 4th
Street and into Chinatown. The plan further describes how the Planning Department has
“prioritized listening, engagement, and dialogue” in the creation of the plan, holding open
houses, public hearings, check-ins with the mayor’s and supervisor Kim’s (of the district) office,
231
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walking tours, community surveys, an online discussion board, and meetings with various
stakeholder groups.236
During the creation of the Cental SoMa Plan, TODCO also created its own alternative
rezoning plan for the area being studied by the Planning Department. The “Central SoMa
Community Plan,” developed by TODCO, does not represent a total shift away from the Central
SoMa Plan, but rather a shift in the scale of the plan. The Central SoMa Community Plan
generally calls for less office development than that seen in the Central SoMa Plan (though it still
advocates for building offices for the tech sector) and more permanently affordable housing. The
Plan does not challenge the rezoning of PDR space, but requires varying degrees of replacement
PDR space. The plan calls for allowing new tech companies to thrive in the South of Market, as
long as the existing neighborhood is respected and enhanced.237
A huge component of the Central SoMa Plan, that especially is publicly pushed, are the
stated public benefits, such as affordable housing and transportation funds, that are to be gained
from the plan’s rezoning. The plan states that:
The Central SoMa Plan is expected to generate up to $2 billion in public benefits to serve the neighborhood
over the life of the Plan. Without it, the neighborhood could receive approximately $300 million in public
benefits. The Plan therefore provides the potential for a 667 percent increase in public benefits for Central
SoMa...This $2 billion would be derived exclusively from new development allowing for approximately
5,000 market-rate housing units and approximately 40,000 new jobs.238

The top three public benefit categories to be funded (in order) are stated as affordable housing,
transportation, and PDR.239
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The Central Subway and the Role of Transit

The construction of the Central Subway (ongoing) is one of the core reasons stated for
the creation of the Central SoMa Plan. The Central Subway, slated to extend service up 4th Street
from the Caltrain station into Chinatown, is said to provide the opportunity for part of the South
of Market to undergo “transit oriented development.”
Relating the topics of infrastructure (such as transit), development, and growth, Jason
Henderson describes in the book Street Fight: The Politics of Mobility in San Francisco:
Capitalism has an extraordinary need for mobility, as mobility is part of the capital infrastructure that
enables the production and circulation of capital. Roads and transit lines are the primary conduits of urban
mobility, but they are also conduits of capital flows and arbiters of exchange value...As the scale of the
capitalist economy grows, so does the demand for more mobility. Improving the speed and access of
transportation systems becomes synonymous with economic growth and individual advancement...as the
demands of the market change, these fixed infrastructures [of mobility] must be modified or destroyed and
replaced...Thus neoliberals, in the guise of real estate developers, landowners, bankers, financiers, and
producers of new mobility, communications, and distribution technologies, are actively engaged in the
politics of mobility in order to ensure that the spaces they need are built and then reshuffled or destroyed
and replaced under their terms.240

In this sense, the development of the Central Subway and the Central SoMa Plan can be seen in
relation to the growing needs of the local capitalist economy, especially as the technology sector
expands in San Francisco and the larger Bay Area.
The development of the Central SoMa Plan is strongly tied to transit, with the new
Central Subway project providing much of the stated impetus for the plan. The plan was created
with the Central Subway going right through the middle on 4th Street in order to “include areas
within easy walking distance (i.e., two blocks) of the Central Subway’s 4th Street alignment,”
building on calls from Plan Bay Area to do TOD.241 The new Central Subway line is a project of
the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA) and will extend the Muni T-Line
240
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from the stop at 4th and King Streets (by the Caltrain station) through South of Market and into
Chinatown. Construction began in 2012 and the subway is set to open to the public in 2019,
adding four new stops at 4th and Brannan Streets (4th and Brannan Station, street level), 4th and
Folsom Streets (Yerba Buena/Moscone Station, underground), Stockton Street at Union Square
(Union Square/Market Street Station, underground), and Stockton and Washington Streets
(Chinatown Station, underground).242
The Planning Department began the planning process for the Central SoMa Plan in 2011
with funding from the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and the SFMTA.243
Further, as the Central SoMa Plan Initial Study details, “The Central SoMa Planning Process was
informed by intensive community outreach efforts and by growth projections.”244 The growth
projections for the plan were directly taken from Plan Bay Area, which was created by the
Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) and the Metropolitan Transportation
Commission (MTC). Further, SFMTA is governed by a seven member board, all of whom are
appointed by the mayor. This highlights the deep connection among the planning department,
planning commission, local and regional transportation bodies, and the mayor.
As Henderson describes, especially since the 1980’s and the passage of Proposition 13,
San Francisco’s transportation policies have been largely shaped by conservative and neoliberal
forces that see transit not as a social good, but rather as a system that must be re-claimed from
lower-class riders and made safer, more efficient, and more businesslike. This is reflected not
just in the funding structure of MUNI, where downtown commercial property assessments and
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adequate fees are dismissed in favor of local sales taxes, transfers from the general fund (at the
expense of other city services), increased fares, and dependence on more uncertain state and
federal funds, but also in the types of Muni projects themselves.245
One such example is the Central Subway project. Henderson writes:
The Central Subway might improve mobility somewhat between parts of Chinatown and the southeastern
part of the city, but it also will enhance wealth in specific largely neoliberal locales [such as Mission Bay,
upscale urban landfill in the Eastern Neighborhoods, the Moscone Convention Center and Yerba Buena
Gardens, and the Union Square Area]. As currently manifested, the Central Subway is revanchist. It reflects
not a more integrated, egalitarian, citywide approach to transit funding but a steering of public investment,
such as limited sales tax revenue, to specific privileged spaces. In other words, San Francisco is investing
in an expensive new rail line that enhances land values in a specific corridor identified as being profitable
rather than in a more mundane improvement of overcrowded bus routes. Under contemporary
neoliberalism, municipal government prioritizes an urban transportation policy, in this case the Central
Subway, that enhances business competitiveness and provides a foundation for gentrification, which
increases real estate values.246

Several problems that have been identified with the Central Subway, some of which were
alluded to in the above excerpt, include poor allocation of funding (the Central Subway is a 1.7
mile, $1.6 billion dollar project) that could have instead gone towards other existing transit needs
(especially surface transit), the possibility of lost funds for other lines due to operating costs that
might not be met, unreliable federal and state funding sources, lack of local funding sources,
seismic and hydrology concerns, poor design that lacks major present and future connection
points (such as lack of connection to the Market Street Muni Metro lines and the future Transbay
Terminal), and general lack of scrutiny of the merits of the project by city government and the
Board of Supervisors at the time of funding approval.247 Further, a 2011 San Francisco Civil
Grand Jury Report found that there were several issues with the funding and design of the
Central Subway, concluding that “the project must be redesigned.”248
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This analysis helps to provide additional background regarding the impetus for the
Central SoMa Plan. The construction of the Central Subway highlights the profit-driven
priorities of local policy making in San Francisco - a highly questionable line that secures
increased profits and “enhances business competitiveness” for certain private interests, while
providing a questionable public service that may in the long term draw resources and services
away from an already overburdened public transit system. The rezoning under the Central SoMa
Plan, in this sense, is almost a given requirement for the forces behind the Central Subway line.
The policies to be enacted by the city government through the Central SoMa Plan remain in line
with the priorities seen in the development of the Central Subway.

Critique of the Central SoMa Plan: Land Use, Jobs, Housing, Displacement, Prop M,
Public Benefits, Funding Sources, and Public Outreach and Engagement

The Central SoMa Plan is primarily concerned with building office space for technology
companies and constructing market-rate housing.249 The public is said to benefit from increased
fees and taxes that will go towards affordable housing, transit, and parks (among other stated
benefits). Yet, the public benefits are seen as secondary (and more importantly are highly
misleading) and the increased profit potential from rezoning as primary (couched in the logic of
providing new commercial and residential space).
The plan demonstrates a continuing of historical trends, particularly since the Post WWII
period, in terms of continuing the expansion of the downtown into the South of Market and
shifting away from blue-collar land uses. The protections won by neighborhood and community
activists in the late 1980’s, of getting the areas surrounding the downtown rezoned to protect
249
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housing, neighborhood businesses, and neighborhood character (including part of the South of
Market) as part of the Downtown Plan, are now being undermined with the proposed rezoning
under the Central SoMa Plan. The wedding of local government with business interests that was
solidified in the post-WWII period continues to this day, with the close relationship between big
tech and city hall represented in the mayor’s donors and supporters, such as the angel-investor
Ron Conway. The Central SoMa Plan reflects the needs and goals of the private market in San
Francisco, today led and championed by the technology industry, at the expense of existing
communities.
The historical challenges faced by the largely working class and low-income
communities in the South of Market are today intensified by the second technology boom. Loss
of blue-collar employment options and decreasing housing affordability are the realities for lowincome residents who remain in the South of Market. The physical landscape of the area is
further being altered to mimic the highrise office makeup of the financial district. Diagrams of
new highrises dwarfing existing structures in the proposed Central SoMa Plan announce the
future of the South of Market (see Fig. 18).250
DeLeon discusses the “progrowth regime” that was a product of the post-WWII attempt
to create San Francisco as the corporate headquarters of the Pacific Rim, writing:
From the early 1960s to the mid-1980s...The city’s top business and political leaders invented the
progrowth regime to transform San Francisco into a growth machine. The city’s function would be to
provide the physical and social means of capitalist production and accumulation within a global division of
labor. The progrowth regime became the author of the city’s vision, architect of its plans, and source of its
power to get things done.251

Upon the collapse of the regime in the mid 1980’s, DeLeon argued that there was for a moment
an “antiregime” made up of those that fought the freeways, highrises, and downtown business
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leaders.252 DeLeon writes, “The ultimate function of the antiregime is to protect community from
capital...The primary instrument of this power is local government control over land use and
development. In San Francisco, these growth controls have achieved unprecedented scope in the
types of limits they impose on capital.”253 The antiregime, however, was not able to maintain
power within City Hall, with the election of Art Agnos eventually giving way to the conservative
Frank Jordan who was then succeeded by a wave of business friendly mayors (Willie Brown,
Gavin Newsom, and currently Ed Lee). This is largely reflected in the land use priorities of local
government, highlighted in planning documents such as the Central SoMa Plan, which seek to
maximize profits at the expense of existing communities.

Land Use

The Central SoMa Plan rezones land that was zoned for PDR uses and rezones it to allow
for offices and housing (which were previously banned in the PDR zones designated as
Service/Light Industrial and Service/Arts/Light Industrial), with the exception of two small areas
that retain PDR zoning in the western portion of the plan (by the freeway). This coincides with
very large height increases in the area concentrated south of Harrison Street, going from an
existing high in some areas of 85 feet to highs of 160, 250, and 400 feet in some of the rezoned
areas.254 Such rezoning leads to speculation and displacement as lower paying uses are replaced
by higher paying uses. As Zelda Bronstein, journalist and former Berkeley Planning
Commissioner, describes:
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The Central SoMa Plan encouraged speculation, because the way the real estate market works is it takes a
long time to get the money to assemble the resources to get the credit to put a project forward. In a
downturn of a business cycle, there’s such a thing as land banking where developers buy land at a relatively
cheap rate and they hold onto it until they can develop it. The Central SoMa Plan was initiated in 2011, this
is now almost 2017...When the Planning Department set out way back in 2011, they signaled to the real
estate industry they were going to upzone this neighborhood. That’s inviting speculation, because people
know the land is going to be worth more because they can build more on it.255

Such reports of early speculation have been captured in the media, with one 2015 San Francisco
Business Times article titled, “Lay of the land: Before the Central SoMa plan is complete,
developers are already eagerly grabbing key sites in anticipation of a bonanza.”256 As further
described below, PDR uses play an integral role in maintaining social and economic diversity
within San Francisco.

Jobs

The Central SoMa Plan calls for adding new office space, primarily for technology
companies that are coming to, or want to come to San Francisco. There are several issues with
the push for San Francisco to attract and build jobs primarily for the technology sector. First,
technology companies do not hire locally in San Francisco, meaning that the new jobs produced
will go to wealthier people who currently live outside of the city creating a demand for housing
that cannot be met.257,258 Instead of providing for a diversity of jobs, the plan narrowly focuses
on the most wealth producing uses to fill new development. Second, technology companies hire
255
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primarily white and male workforces, thus increasing the homogenization of residents in San
Francisco.259,260,261
Further, by changing land uses, the plan decimates the existing blue-collar PDR
businesses and jobs in the South of Market. PDR cannot compete with higher paying office uses
and thus will face displacement due to rising rents. The efforts put in place to “protect” PDR in
the plan area by preserving a small area zoned for PDR, limiting conversion of PDR space, and
requiring PDR as part of large developments are inadequate and will not protect the existing
PDR space as it exists nor meet the plan’s goal of ensuring “that the removal of protective
zoning would not result in a net loss of PDR as a result of the plan.”262 While the passage of
Proposition X in 2016 (requiring replacement of certain PDR space) will provide additional
policy aimed at retaining PDR in the South of Market, it is unknown at this point how successful
this proposition will be. The fact that city government has not been able to keep up with
enforcing the existing zoning in the South of Market, allowing illegal conversions of PDR space
into office space, further speaks to the likelihood of PDR displacement under the new proposed
zoning.263
PDR jobs provide higher wages for working class residents with the lowest levels of
skills and education (especially compared to the wages paid by service sector jobs), are more
stable than other sectors (especially office), and are an integral part of the diversity of the local
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economy.264 Further, the PDR sector has been growing in San Francisco.265,266 The only way to
retain PDR businesses and jobs is to enforce and create protective zoning, ensuring that land and
space is available for these uses.

Housing

The majority of new residential development in the plan (77%) is market-rate.267 The
chronic over-building of market-rate units and chronic under building of affordable units will
only work to exacerbate the inequality crisis that is plaguing San Francisco, as the private market
caters to the highest paying individuals.268, 269 Not only are market-rate units unaffordable to lowincome and middle-class South of Market residents, but the type of affordable housing being
proposed, “below market-rate units,” are also not affordable for many current South of Market
residents.270
This imbalance of housing types is also inconsistent with the Association of Bay Area
Government’s (ABAG) Regional Housing Needs Allocation (RHNA) which provides projected
housing needs by income for each of the Bay Area counties. The 2014 - 2022 RHNA calls for
42% of new housing to be market-rate (over 120% of Area Median Income), and 58% of new
264
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housing to be moderate/low/very low income (from 120% to less than 50% of Area Median
Income).271 This shows how the Central SoMa Plan will help to continue San Francisco’s trend
of over-building market-rate housing at the expense of lower and moderate income residents.
The other issue with building a majority of market-rate units is that market-rate units
actually create the need for additional affordable housing. According to the Residential Nexus
Analysis study commissioned by the City of San Francisco (which looks at the impact of the
development of market-rate housing on affordable housing demand), for every 100 new marketrate units produced in San Francisco, it creates the need for an additional 43 units of new
affordable housing.272 San Francisco, however, does not build affordable housing at nearly the
same rate as market-rate housing. Thus, the creation of market-rate units further exacerbates the
affordability crisis.

Displacement

The plan discusses how increased land values are a direct product of both the rezoning by
the plan and the construction of the central subway.273 Yet the plan does not protect against what
results from increased land values - speculation, evictions, and displacement. The plan offers no
new protections for existing residents, businesses, non-profits, and other community serving
institutions against displacement or eviction.274 Other than the push to preserve specific historic
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areas and buildings, the plan does not address displacement that the city knows will occur due to
new development, as is evident in the “communities of concern” laid out in Plan Bay Area.275,276
Further, a University of California Berkeley report on transit oriented development and
gentrification shows how areas in the Bay Area that are located close to transit are more likely to
suffer gentrification and displacement (with displacement even more likely for areas where there
are a majority of renters). In San Francisco, these areas include those near the Central Subway.277
The plan states the goal of “maintaining the diversity of residents,” yet the new policies
enacted to meet this goal only include requiring a percentage of two and three bedroom units, a
new Community Services Fee (addressed below in the “funding sources” section), and specific
policies aimed at achieving 33% affordable housing.278 The issue with these policies is that they
will not work to maintain the diversity of residents. Preventing against displacement is the only
way to maintain the diversity of residents, otherwise, as has already been seen in San Francisco,
low-income residents and disproportionately people of color will be displaced.
The plan also states the goal of “preserving and celebrating the neighborhood’s cultural
heritage” with a particular focus on the Filipino and LGBTQ communities in the South of
Market. This is mainly said to be achieved through creating cultural heritage districts and
preserving certain historic sites and areas.279 It is unclear how the cultural heritage districts will
function to preserve cultural heritage and if and how they will be able to prevent the
displacement of existing communities, specifically the Filipino and LGBTQ communities. The
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focus on preserving buildings does not prevent actual people, businesses, and nonprofits from
being displaced. As Angelica Cabande, a community activist and organizer in the South of
Market, describes, “In Central SoMa they [the Planning Department] talk about there’s
gentrification and displacement, in particular with the Filipino community, and then when you
read the area plan it doesn’t specify how that’s going to be addressed, aside from being
recognized that there is a SoMa Pilipinas Cultural Heritage District, it doesn’t specify those
things.”280 In this sense, the Planning Department and the city are willing to recognize and name
the problem (displacement) and the potential communities that will be affected (in this instance
the Filipino and LGBTQ communities), yet no action is taken to create concrete policies to
address concerns of displacement.

Proposition M

One issue with the Central SoMa Plan is the reality of Proposition M, the 1986 ballot
measure that created an annual cap on office space development. The plan calls for a massive
rezoning that will allow for the “potential” of more than 10 million square feet in office space to
be built over the next 20 years. With Proposition M, however, there is an annual 950,000 square
foot cap for new office development creating an immediate tension between existing and new
city policy.281 As the Draft EIR (DEIR) for the Central SoMa Plan describes, the more than 10
million in square feet of office space expected to be built “represents about 11 years of the
annual limit’s large building allocation. However...there are other very large office projects
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outside the Plan Area that would be anticipated to draw down the office space allocation.”282
Thus, the DEIR itself admits that there are existing problems with the anticipated growth to
happen under the Central SoMa Plan versus other parts of the city in the face of this cap.
The purpose of Proposition M was to seek a balance among housing, transportation, and
employment, a large part of which included regulating the rate at which office construction could
occur. This has worked to help keep San Francisco’s economy from experiencing the pitfalls of
others cities who overbuilt office space, with the 25 Year Downtown Plan Monitoring Report
1985 - 2009 stating that “With mandated office development caps, San Francisco did not see the
level of speculative office development as other cities have experienced over the past 25
years.”283 Further, it has worked to help control the rate at which San Francisco develops and
changes, working to help buffer neighborhood communities from the negative effects of rapid
development during economic booms in San Francisco.
However, there have been successful attempts at undermining Proposition M, by taking
large development projects to the ballot box for voter approval (as required in Proposition M for
an exemption to the cap), as seen with the Candlestick Point/Hunters Point Shipyard
development project (exempted in 2016).

Public Benefits

The plan outlines how money that is generated from new development will be allocated
to new “public benefits.” They include: affordable housing ($900 million), transit ($500 million),
PDR ($180 million), parks and recreation ($160 million), complete streets ($130 million),
282
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environmental sustainability ($70 million), schools and childcare ($50 million), cultural
preservation ($40 million), and community services ($20 million).284
Looking just at the first three, affordable housing, transit, and PDR, much can be gained
as to what can be expected from the plan in terms of benefits to the public.
The funds for affordable housing produced will go towards constructing 2,600 new
(mainly “below market-rate”) housing units (33% of the total housing units being produced
under the plan). Of these 2,600 units, 700 are expected to be built on-site and the other 1,900 are
to be built off-site and/or funded through in-lieu fees, with the plan stating that the units built by
in-lieu fees “could fall behind the market rate development that provided the fees or land, in
some instances by several years, assuming that additional funding is not directed to the Plan
area.”285 Further, over the last ten years San Francisco has lost affordable housing at almost the
same rate that is has produced it, with 5,700 units being built and 4,200 units being lost.286 The
plan provides no new means of protecting against the loss of existing affordable housing.287 This
shows how the affordable housing produced has an unsure timeline and is already being lost at
an exceptional rate, which obscures the commitment to the production of new affordable
housing.
Of the funds produced for transit, two-thirds ($333 million) will go towards the SFMTA
and one-third ($167 million) will go towards regional transit (BART, AC Transit, Caltrain, and
long term transit studies).288 The funds that will go to SFMTA are stated as helping SFMTA, “to
support a state of good repair on the existing Muni fleet and infrastructure, as well as
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enhancement and expansion of services.”289 The fact that one-third of the transit funds will go to
regional transit flies in the face of “public benefits,” as the public here is extended to the larger
Bay Area. Of the funds dedicated to the SFMTA, close to half (42%) are to accumulate “over the
lifespan of the Plan and beyond.”290 While it is already highly questionable that $333 million in
funds for SFMTA would be enough for local transit to absorb tens of thousands of new workers
and residents in San Francisco (SFMTA currently has an annual operating budget of over one
billion dollars), the fact that close to half of these funds will come “over the lifespan of the Plan
and beyond” is highly reflective of the dubious nature of the stated “public benefits.”291 The last
point shows how while the city can make changes to significantly increase the local population
(both in terms of workers and residents) through rezoning, the city is much less capable of
acquiring the funds necessary to address the infrastructure needs, here just in terms of
transportation, to accommodate this new population.
The funds for PDR that are to be produced, set at the dollar amount of $180 million,
actually represents the dollar amount given to the new requirement in the plan of requiring large
commercial developments to provide PDR space.292 This “public benefit” actually represents a
token effort by the city to require new PDR in certain new developments due to the loss of
protected PDR space as a result of the rezoning of the plan. Thus, this “public benefit” is highly
misleading as it is actually a defensive move to recuperate a small fraction of the PDR space that
will be lost due to the plan.
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Funding Sources

From the start, the plan’s funding sources for infrastructure and public amenities assume
that all of the development that is projected to happen under the plan will happen. The plan only
implements three new taxes/fees on new development (one of which would be subject to voter
approval). These include a Mello-Roos Community Facilities District Tax that goes primarily to
transit (to be collected over the 25 year span of the plan and requires voter approval to be
implemented), a Central SoMa Fee that goes towards affordable housing, and a Community
Services Fee to go towards community services (to be collected over the span of the plan). The
other fee that is required for the Central SoMa Plan is the Eastern Neighborhoods Impact Fee
because the plan falls within the boundaries of the Eastern Neighborhoods Plan. The rest of the
fees and requirements on new development are existing city policies on new development.293
The issue with the funding sources for infrastructure and public amenities is that they are
simply not enough in relation to the proposed development under the Central SoMa Plan. As was
seen with the Eastern Neighborhoods Plan, the funding sources for infrastructure and public
amenities were insufficient to provide the necessary improvements required for all the new
development that took place/is taking place. With the case of the Central SoMa Plan, this issue
looks to be largely repeated. Of the new fees/taxes, the Central SoMa Fee is fully dedicated to
funding below market-rate units that will likely fall behind the rest of the development, the
Community Services Fee is likely to fall behind the rest of development (as admitted by the
plan), and the Mello-Roos Tax is annual, meaning that new development could outpace the
projected benefits of this tax, not to mention that it is not a large enough tax to cover the types of
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transit improvements tens of thousands of new people require, and it needs to be approved by a
vote.294

Public Outreach and Engagement

The Planning Department’s public outreach and engagement process involved holding
open houses, public hearings, check-ins with the mayor’s and Supervisor Kim’s office, walking
tours, community surveys, an online discussion board, and meetings with various stakeholder
groups.295 In an interview with the Central SoMa Plan project manager Steve Wertheim, the
process was described in this way:
We just listened [to the public] for a year...Probably the most important thing we did was we reached out
pro-actively to a bunch of community groups and said ‘we want to talk to you.’ A public meeting is a weird
place because it’s an environment you haven’t been in before and people are talking at you. Whereas a
community group that you’re already showing up to, your community group, and it’s your home and your
rules and your turf, and we come to you and we listen to you or we hear what you have to say and we
answer your questions. I always feel like that’s the best thing. We’re not trying to hide anything. The
opposite, we’re trying to share and make sure it works for people and their lived reality and they can
understand our vision and buy in...Probably if I’d done it again [the Central SoMa Plan], I would have
written down who the ideas were from as we incorporated them into the plan. But we incorporated those
ideas into the plan all the time. People really like light and air and that’s what makes SoMa special. It’s
dense but not oppressive. We developed all these special rules to set back the height limits...or for people
the most important thing was sidewalks were so uncomfortable so we identified a bunch of money to make
those sidewalks wider - all those ideas”296

The above quote poses some conflicting accounts of public involvement in the creation of the
plan. While specific ideas such as more access to light and air and better sidewalks were
identified as being incorporated into the plan as a result of public engagement, the fact that the
Planning Department was trying to “share [the plan] and make sure it works for people” suggests
that the plan was largely developed prior to the public outreach performed by the planning
department.
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Looking at the Central Corridor Background Report (May 2011) and the Central Corridor
Public Realm Report (October 2011), released about the same time the public outreach and
engagement process began, which describes the aims of the plan surrounding jobs, housing, and
the public realm (open space, sidewalks, etc.), it appears the Planning Department had largely
figured out what the core aims and goals of the Central SoMa Plan were before the public
became involved (with the earliest public outreach efforts taking place in June 2011). The two
reports contain the core principles of the final Central SoMa Plan (though with less specific
detail) of increasing capacity for jobs and housing, facilitating TOD, and improving streets,
sidewalks, open spaces, traffic, transit, biking conditions, and air quality (the Central SoMa Plan
later added the additional goals of “maintaining the diversity of residents,” “preserving cultural
heritage,” “creating an environmentally sustainable neighborhood,” and “ensuring that new
buildings enhance the character of the neighborhood”).297,298,299 The two goals added of
maintaining diversity and preserving cultural heritage were concepts that were largely absent
from the 2011 reports, yet, as described above, are extremely lacking in terms of new policies
needed to actually carry out these goals.
The fact that the Central SoMa Plan Initial Study also states that the planning process was
informed by growth projections also speaks to the point of the plan being largely predetermined.300
As described by Cabande:

297

Central Corridor Planning Project Background Report. San Francisco: San Francisco Planning Department,
2011. Accessed March, 2017.
http://default.sfplanning.org/Citywide/Central_Corridor/Central_Corridor_Background_Report.pdf
298
Public Realm Existing Conditions Assessment Central Corridor Planning Project. San Francisco: San Francisco
Planning Department, 2011. Accessed March, 2017.
http://208.121.200.84/ftp//files/Citywide/Central_Corridor/CC_PublicRealmExistingConditionsReport_Oct2011.pdf
299
Central SoMa: Plan and Implementation Strategy, ii-iii.
300
Initial Study: Central SoMa Plan, 4.

87

It’s been challenging because they [the Planning Department] would do community meetings without
adequate outreach. For example last year or two years ago they even did an online ‘where did people want
fees from Central SoMa to come [to]?’ And instead of having community meetings that are culturally
competent they just put it on a website...They are including us but not prioritizing our needs. We’re still
seeing that the city is still tokenizing what we’re saying in a way. It’s still not in a place where there is a
balance between community development and community input.301

As described above, issues of cultural competency were present in the format of the Planning
Department’s outreach and engagement strategy. For an area as diverse in terms of languages
and cultures as the South of Market, cultural competency is a crucial aspect of public outreach.
Further, Cabande expressed the experience of the planning process as lacking a complete
representation of community needs and desires.
My research included attending a Planning Commission Hearing on the Revised Central
SoMa Plan in August 2016, and attending an open house on the Revised Central SoMa Plan in
November 2016. The Planning Commission Hearing involved a presentation from Steve
Wertheim (the Central SoMa Plan project manager), followed by public comment (of which I
participated), and responses from the commission. It is unclear what impact the public comment
had on the planning process (if any at all).
At the open house, planning department staff, led by Wertheim, presented a section of the
revised Central SoMa Plan. As one walked into the room where the presentation was being held
at the Bayanihan Center, there was a large poster board with the title “$2 Billion in Public
Benefits” on a stand near the entrance (see Fig. 19). The public in attendance was majority white
and adult, and the entire presentation was held in English only. The presentation involved a
PowerPoint presentation with direct pages taken out of the plan being presented and read, with
no attempt to replace planning jargon. There was no question/answer period, and the presentation
ended with the opportunity for members of the public to mingle and ask questions one on one
with the planning department staff. There was a questionnaire given to each member of the
301
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public which allowed some feedback, yet it is unclear what exactly was done with these
questionnaires (see Fig. 20). According to Wertheim, he receives all the questionnaires and goes
through them personally so that he can respond to people’s questions and see if they are being
heard.302
Based on my own ethnographic research, and existing Central SoMa Plan planning
reports, it appears the public outreach and engagement process undertaken for the plan was more
about presenting a pre-defined plan to the public to diffuse opposition first, and receiving
feedback second. The fact that the core priorities stated in the preliminary 2011 reports coincide
with the core priorities present in the final plan speak to this point.
Three major parts of the plan were ultimately altered. The first two seem to have been
largely from outside public pressure - the changing of the name of the plan from the “Central
Corridor Plan” to the “Central SoMa Plan,” and provisions in the final draft of attempting to
retain PDR (instead of instituting no controls on the loss of PDR). The final change was
administrative, and came in the form of redrawing the boundaries in the northern portion of the
plan to maintain general consistency with other existing plans (specifically the Downtown
Plan).303

Lessons from other Area Plans

Looking to other existing area plans that have already been implemented in San
Francisco helps give a sense of what may come as a result of the implementation of the Central
SoMa Plan. The Downtown Plan, the Eastern Neighborhoods Plan, and the Western SoMa
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Community Plan have all accomplished their primary goals of increasing development in San
Francisco, in terms of both commercial and residential development. However, the outcomes of
development have been highly uneven. Offices and market-rate housing have been the core
drivers of new development under these area plans. This development aids the increase of a
strictly wealthier, better-educated, and higher earning population of people in San Francisco.
This comes at the cost of increased housing prices, displacement, evictions, and gentrification as
higher paying individuals/businesses/corporations replace existing lower paying uses. As Lord
explains, “Almost invariably when you get into a situation where a planning department comes
in and upzones and increases property values by giving them greater development potential, you
are going to get displacement. Invariably...I think that they’re [area plans] more enabling of
displacement than they are of anything else. In terms of being able to address those issues, I
don’t think they [area plans] do a very good job.”304
The increase in jobs and population have also led to a situation in San Francisco where
infrastructure, as especially seen in transportation, cannot keep up with new development. As
Kelly describes, “What happened in the Eastern Neighborhoods is the same thing that happens
with all the other area plans. And it’s happening today with the Central SoMa Plan. Which is that
planning identifies what the maximum possible impact fee is, which would be the amount
sufficient to pay for the infrastructure, and developers scream bloody murder...So they reduce the
impact fee.”305 Colen expands on this, stating:
There are some core battle zones in San Francisco…[and another one is] Infrastructure [and] benefits. ‘Ok,
we approved this development, but we were promised parks, better transit, bike lanes - don’t see any of
that.’ And they’re [the public] not wrong about that. One of the key things about area plans is this idea of
height and upzoning, which confers enormous value to landowners who own the property. Accepted public
wisdom is that you extract a certain portion of that, that goes to the community. It’s supposed to provide
public benefits, and we haven’t solved that. So there’s a lot of fighting about, ‘This is bullshit. We see all
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the height, and our parks are shit, and we don’t have the bike lanes, and the community groups are still
being displaced.’306

In addition to a lack of infrastructure, affordable housing is simply not being produced, and bluecollar PDR space is sacrificed wherever it exists. Further, development is occurring at a rate
faster than expected in these decades long plans, often more subject to regional and global
economic forces than local planning directives.
Taken together, these plans tend to do exactly what they were set up to do, help
streamline new development while having the facade of public approval, engagement, and
benefits. The problem is what the outcomes are for the existing population. As Kelly describes:
They [developers] don’t want a site by site fight on spot zoning because then they have to do a brand new
negotiation every single time. And neither do we, that’s exhausting, we can’t fight that every single time.
So the idea of a neighborhood plan is saying what can we accept, will we be ok with, and what can they do
so they have certainty. The problem is what if the plan is not to your satisfaction, on the neighborhood side.
What if they screw you over with the neighborhood and everybody gets to go through by-right and you’ve
got to try and throw log jams in their way. So that’s one problem. The other problem is that they always try
and intensify their use anyway, they try and get exceptions to the area plan - ‘oh you don’t mind if we go a
little higher or a little more dense or not give you this little bit of open space’ - they ask for exceptions and
they get them like candy on Halloween. There are a number of ways, a couple dozen ways that the planning
process is biased against neighborhoods. And this is another one. Developers get to ask for exceptions, the
neighborhood does not. The area plan and the area plan protocols and exemptions are not a ceiling, they are
a floor for developers, and it was sold to us in the neighborhoods as a ceiling and it isn’t.307

Here, Kelly highlights many of the problems associated with the implementation of an area plan
(even when there is real community support and interest in an area plan), specifically on the
community side of the agreement made for rezoning. These are the same issues that face the
South of Market neighborhood under the current rezoning proposal.
The Western SoMa Community Plan, however, is an interesting case of contestation
within the history of area plans and larger planning in San Francisco under the Planning
Department. The Western SoMa Community Plan took on a level of grassroots community
planning that was very unique, having a degree of autonomy from the Planning Department that
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other area plans have not had. Yet, the outcomes of the Western SoMa Community Plan have
been short-lived and undermined by the current rezoning happening in the Central SoMa Plan. In
this sense, the area plan that may have had the most hope in terms of providing all of its stated
goals did not last very long. But even the Western SoMa Community Plan faces questions about
lack of affordable housing and challenges to providing infrastructure improvements for
population growth.
Another core issue highlighted by existing area plans is the question of timing and
implementation. The three area plans analyzed above did not foresee future changes that were to
occur in San Francisco - specifically booms and busts in the local economy. This is a huge issue
with area plans, as the EIR for a plan is done only once at a very specific moment in history. This
demonstrates the way in which streamlining new development under an area plan can create
unforeseen consequences that are not fully studied or understood by the initial plan. Another
issue with the timing of area plans is who the “public” is during the creation of the plan versus
when it is implemented. As Colen describes:
Eastern Neighborhoods [Plan] took I think ten, eleven, twelve years depending on how you count, from the
time they started talking about rezoning old industrial land until it was delivered. And by the time it passes
there are people that don’t even know what it’s about. ‘Wait a minute, no one ever told me what this is
about, how can you come in and rezone my neighborhood?’ ‘Well, we’ve been at it for years and years, so.’
Presumably by the time Central SoMa came around, they’ve done it enough and they’re getting better at it.
So, Central SoMa’s done a lot better and its been achieved faster. I think it's four, five years, six tops.
Which is lightening speed in San Francisco to do a rezoning...One of the big fights right now is going to be
to see if community groups can delegitimize the Eastern Neighborhoods Plan. So, contrast to Central
SoMa, it’s still too early but I haven’t heard anyone - I guess it hasn’t passed. But, who knows in a few
years when tall buildings are starting to sprout up in Central SoMa, it’s possible people say ‘what the who’s the idiot that approved this, where did this come from? You can’t do that, you’re ruining the city, the
skyline.’308

This shows several issues with the timing and implementation of area plans. When populations
are changing, how can public “consensus” be achieved when the process of implementing an
area plan can take several years or even over a decade?
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Another important case of development plans can be seen in the proposed 2005 MidMarket Redevelopment plan and later the Mid-Market Twitter tax break. While these are not
cases of area plans specifically, they highlight the possibilities and challenges of land-use
planning in part of the South of Market (closest to Market Street). While the Twitter tax break
has been a defining feature of the current administration's position towards planning and
economic growth, the proposed Redevelopment area offers an alternative of what could have
been and what could be. The Twitter tax break has worked to attract technology companies to
San Francisco, as desired. In this sense, it is in line with the main priorities seen in the Central
SoMa Plan. The proposed Mid-Market Redevelopment area, however, sought a different type of
regeneration - one based in the arts and affordable housing. This type of planning may have
worked to better stabilize this area against displacement and develop the area as a space for
existing residents and businesses, instead of developing it as an extension of the downtown
office district.
Reflecting back on the Central SoMa Plan in light of analyzing three other existing area
plans, as well as the proposed and passed legislation for Mid-Market, much of the pitfalls
apparent in the existing plans are apparent in the proposed Central SoMa Plan. These pitfalls for
the Central SoMa Plan include a reliance on the development of office space and market-rate
housing as the drivers for the plan. This is coupled with sources of funding for infrastructure
improvements that are highly questionable as to whether or not they can meet the funding needs
of the increased jobs and population that would result from new development under the plan. The
goal of achieving 33% affordable housing, while higher than that achieved under the other area
plans, would still be inadequate to meet the housing needs by income as projected by the
Regional Housing Needs Allocation - seen the other way around, the plan calls for producing
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77% market-rate housing. PDR space is set to be lost, with controls put in place that are unlikely
to prevent displacement of these uses. As exhibited by the Eastern Neighborhoods Plan, which
sought as a primary goal to stabilize and retain PDR, such efforts have failed.

Part 3: Conclusion

This section critically analyzed the Central SoMa Plan and offered a critique of the
problems associated with the proposed plan and rezoning of the South of Market. While the plan
seeks to add 10 million square feet of new office space, 45,000 jobs, and 7,800 new housing
units, it does not provide any new protections for residents, businesses, non-profits, and other
community serving institutions against displacement or eviction. Further, the measures put in
place to retain PDR are inadequate and will likely fail to prevent the displacement of PDR. The
type of new development sought under the plan is high-end office and housing development this type of development is for a strictly wealthier, higher-earning, higher-educated, and more
homogenous population. In addition, the “public benefits” package is misleading in nature and
will not provide enough funding to meet the increased public needs of such a population
increase. In this same vein, the infrastructure needed to meet the proposed new development is
not adequately funded by the requirements for new development outlined under the existing plan,
and such infrastructure development will most likely fall behind the office and housing
development (or simply not occur at all). By looking at three existing area plans (as well as the
proposed Mid-Market Redevelopment plan) and the results of their implementation, the
argument is made that the problems associated with these existing area plans will largely be
repeated under the proposed Central SoMa Plan.
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Part 4: What Kind of Growth? Fainstein’s Concept of the “Just City”

This section will offer an alternative vision of development, planning, and growth for
cities that is in many ways opposite to the vision San Francisco currently holds. First, the concept
of the “just city” as developed by Susan S. Fainstein will be discussed, as it relates to San
Francisco. Then, the concept of the just city will be more fully fleshed out by looking at the core
concepts of equity, diversity, and democracy surrounding planning and policy making in cities. It
is then argued that San Francisco must take a “just city” approach to planning, development, and
growth that seeks to address the needs of existing residents, especially residents that are least
well off, if the city wants to maintain diversity based on race, class, and sexuality.

Fainstein and the Just City

San Francisco’s trajectory of growth and development has largely been led by private
interests, captured in the restructuring of the local economy following WWII, the first and
second technology booms, and the catering to private interests for decades by mayors with close
business ties. This, however, has not come without challenges as activists, environmentalists, and
many others have stood up to challenge inequitable development patterns. There have been many
wins by these groups, such as the fight to halt freeway construction, the passage of Proposition
M in 1986, and the eventual passage of rent control in San Francisco.
The priorities set by city policy makers are what ultimately get translated into physical
development plans - the policy of increasing height limits gets translated into zoning map
amendments that greenlight new types of development. In many ways, those who fight against

95

the business dominated development policies of City Hall come to embody many ideals of what
Susan S. Fainstein calls the “just city.” As San Francisco works to actively restructure working
class areas of the city to accommodate high end office and housing uses, the question remains,
what other forms of development and growth exist? One alternative vision of development and
growth comes from Fainstein’s concept of “the just city.” Fainstein describes the just city as “a
city in which public investment and regulation...produce equitable outcomes rather than support
those already well off,” and where public decisions are guided by the tenets of equity,
democracy, and diversity.309 As cities across the country grapple with the same issues of
affordability and income inequality that are seen locally in San Francisco, Fainstein’s model of
the just city provides an alternative vision of change and growth for American cities that puts
people ahead of profit and fights for justice as a main component in urban planning and policy
making.310, 311 For this reason, it is worth briefly exploring Fainstein’s concept of the just city
and how it would apply to San Francisco.
As Fainstein writes:
The choice of justice as the governing norm for evaluating urban policy is obviously value laden. It reacts
to the current emphasis on competitiveness and the dominance in policy making of neoliberal formulations
that aim at reducing government intervention and enabling market processes. Neoliberalism...refers to the
doctrine that market processes result in the efficient allocation of resources and provide incentives that
stimulate innovation and economic growth. For the market to work, state action that distorts prices and
interferes with rewards to investors must be minimized.312

It is in this context that Fainstein calls for a reformulation of the priorities of city policy makers
that moves away from neoliberal notions of “competitiveness” towards a focus on producing just
outcomes in city planning and policy making that reflect the ideas of equity, democracy, and
diversity.
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In describing equity, Fainstein writes, “[equity] refers to a distribution of both material
and nonmaterial benefits derived from public policy that does not favor those who are already
better off at the beginning. Further, it does not require that each person be treated the same but
rather that treatment be appropriate.”313 Fainstein continues, describing how the aim of equity
focused planning and policy making would explicitly help those worst off and would work to
realign the “urban policies, which are typically under the control of pro-growth regimes, [which]
have favored the well-off over the disadvantaged” towards a pro-equity regime.314 A pro-equity
planning and policy focus does the opposite and focuses on the less well off, and “should be
redistributive, not simply economically but also, as appropriate, politically, socially, and
spatially.”315 In terms of planning and policy recommendations to achieve equity, Fainstein
suggests providing more below-median income housing as a result of new development,
completely retaining the supply of existing affordable housing, not allowing homes or businesses
to be involuntarily relocated for the purpose of economic development, requiring economic
development to focus on employees and small business, subjecting megaprojects to heightened
scrutiny, keeping transit fares very low, and requiring planners to take an active role in pressing
for egalitarian solutions and blocking ones that favor the already well-off.316
On democracy, Fainstein describes how:
There need not be an expectation of high levels of participation by people who do not wish to take part. The
purpose of inclusion in decision making should be to have interests fairly represented, not to value
participation in and of itself. If justice is the goal, the requirement of democracy is mainly instrumental without it, those with less power are likely to be treated badly.317

Fainstein goes on to explain that the focus on democracy comes second to that of equity, as the
focus on democracy as a good in itself is less important in the discussion of the just city than the
313
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ability of democracy to be an instrument in the “achievement of the just.” In terms of planning
and policy recommendations to achieve democracy, Fainstein suggests allowing groups that are
not able to participate directly in decision-making to be represented by advocates, requiring that
development plans be done in consultation with the existing population though they should not
be the sole decision makers, and that when planning is done in uninhabited or sparsely inhabited
areas there should be broad consultation with groups that live outside the areas.318
On diversity, Fainstein writes:
respect to diversity does not require that people who cannot get along live next door to each other. Indeed,
people should have the right to protect themselves from others who do not respect their way of life. What is
important is that people are not differentiated and excluded according to ascriptive characteristics such as
gender, ethnicity, or homelessness.319

In terms of planning and policy recommendations to achieve diversity, Fainstein suggests not
requiring homes to move to achieve diversity but also requiring new communities that are built
to resist segregation, requiring zoning to foster inclusion rather than be discriminatory, creating
porous boundaries between districts, requiring public space to be widely accessible, requiring
land uses to be mixed where practical and desired by affected populations, and requiring public
authorities to assist historically disadvantaged groups in achieving access to housing, education,
and employment.320
Fainstein reflects on the possibilities of achieving the just city, writing “there are obvious
limits to what can be accomplished at the metropolitan level. At the very least, however, a
concern with justice can prevent urban regimes from displacing residents involuntarily,
destroying communities, and directing resources at costly megaprojects that offer few general
benefits.”321 Unfortunately, the proposed Central SoMa Plan does not reflect the goals outlined
318
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under the just city; in fact, the Central SoMa Plan and the larger growth strategy for San
Francisco reflect the exact opposite. Under the tenets of equity, democracy, and diversity, the
development and growth patterns of San Francisco (including those proposed under the Central
SoMa Plan) largely fail on these three fronts (especially equity). San Francisco is becoming more
homogenous in terms of class and race, yet an overview of the social and economic development
of San Francisco shows a continued trend towards aiding and increasing this homogeneity.
In order to move away from a neoliberal growth model of “competitiveness,” San
Francisco must embrace such planning and policy suggestions as outlined above that focus on
the justice of a planning project or public policy decision especially as it relates to equity,
diversity, democracy, and those least well-off in San Francisco. As the South of Market is home
to a very diverse population, in terms of race, class, and sexuality, the concepts of the just city
are especially relevant as the city moves towards a rezoning that aims to benefit the already welloff at the expense of an existing community.

Part 4: Conclusion

This section discussed Susan S. Fainstein’s concept of the “just city,” where planning and
policy making focus on the goals of achieving equity, diversity, and democracy in cities. This
approach moves away from a “competitiveness” model and puts people ahead of profit and fights
for justice as a main component in urban planning and policy making. This section argues that
such an approach to planning and policy making must be taken to ensure that people and not
profits are at the center of development decisions. This section further argues that the proposed
Central SoMa Plan fails on all three fronts of equity, diversity, and democracy.
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Analytical Reflection on Summer Internship with the South of Market Community Action
Network and Policy Recommendations

This section will discuss my summer internship and my experience dealing with the
Central SoMa Plan in the context of engaging in community planning. This is followed by a set
of policy recommendations regarding planning, development, and growth in San Francisco (and
all cities that are facing similar conditions).

Summer Internship

During the summer of 2016, I interned with the South of Market Community Action
Network (SOMCAN), a community based organization in the South of Market that engages in
neighborhood organizing, community planning, and direct service work, as a Community
Planning intern. My role as a Community Planning intern was to analyze and critique the Central
SoMa Plan and create a series of presentations about the plan for residents and other community
partners. In this process I also participated in speaking at Planning Commission hearings on the
Central SoMa Plan. The internship provided me with the opportunity to get firsthand experience
in land use planning and community planning. This research paper expands on the research and
work I did with SOMCAN and delves more fully into the historical context of the Central SoMa
Plan.
SOMCAN engages in community planning to ensure culturally competent community
input in the planning process from low-income immigrant communities and people of color in
San Francisco, seeking to address the impacts of such planning on vulnerable and existing
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populations.322 As seen in the analysis of the Central SoMa Plan, the voices represented by
SOMCAN are not adequately represented and incorporated into the planning process in San
Francisco, especially as seen in the creation of area plans. This highlights the importance of
community based planning and organizing and the need to constantly put pressure on local city
government and city agencies to represent those who are the most vulnerable and marginalized.

Policy Recommendations

Based on the internship described above and the research done in the paper, there are
explicit policy recommendations to be made:
1) The city should support and actively promote community based planning models that
prioritize the needs of existing residents and communities, not wealthy future
populations. This could be done through a direct partnership between community partners
and the planning department (as seen in the Western SoMa Community Plan), or through
more extensive funding of and partnerships with existing community organizations that
engage in community planning.
2) If the city states a commitment to preventing displacement and supporting existing
cultures and diversity in planning efforts, this should be met with new concrete policy
proposals that work directly towards those ends. For instance, if the city wants to
maintain a variety of job types, it should actively protect working class PDR land uses,
not eliminate them. If such goals cannot be met by existing policy, new policy should be
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developed. If new policy cannot be developed, the city should not engage in development
activities that actively promote displacement.
3) The city should require that developers pay for the costs (transportation, schools, parks,
etc.) associated with the increase in population to San Francisco that results from new
development. If new development cannot provide the resources necessary for new
infrastructure/infrastructure improvements, it should not be allowed.
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Conclusion

The Central SoMa Plan presents a snapshot of the current historical and economic
moment in San Francisco - one marked by a wealthy technology sector, vast amounts of capital,
and high rates of displacement. This plan, as well as other area plans in San Francisco, presents
the local government’s and the Planning Department’s vision for the future of San Francisco, one
where high end office jobs and market-rate housing dominate. With this vision comes a new,
wealthier, and more homogenous population, all at the expense of existing populations and
businesses, especially low-income populations, populations of color, and blue-collar jobs.
This moment, however, is part of a larger historical trend in San Francisco of the
continual expansion of the largely built-up downtown/financial district into the traditionally
working class neighborhood of the South of Market. This is aided by a continuation of the close
relationship between high-profile corporate interests and city politicians (especially the mayors
of San Francisco).
This restructuring proposed by the Central SoMa Plan of the South of Market primarily
has one purpose - to remove lower-paying uses and replace them with higher paying uses. This
ultimately means replacing blue-collar jobs and low-income residents with high-paying
professional office jobs and wealthier residents. This works to further the displacement and
eviction crisis plaguing San Francisco and enables the most destructive aspects of free market
capitalism here locally in San Francisco.
Area plans generally reflect the tensions that exist between communities/neighborhoods
and private development, as area plans seek to create a plan that will both facilitate private
investment while at the same time guarantee public benefits and therefore public approval.
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However, as the Central SoMa Plan works to deregulate land uses by removing existing land use
protections while at the same time providing the facade of public benefits and engagement, the
private sector is the one that ultimately wins at the expense of the public.
In order to combat these trends, communities must demand a bottom-up approach to
planning and policy-making that has as its main goal protecting, stabilizing, and aiding the lives
of existing residents, and not just catering to wealthy future residents, workers, and corporations.
This must be achieved through activism, organizing, and coalition building, that builds power
independent of city hall and the Planning Department and works to directly challenge the
interests that those bodies currently represent. In the vein of Fainstein’s concept of the just city,
planning and policy-making must be held up to the values of equity, democracy, and diversity.
On all these fronts the proposed Central SoMa Plan fails. The larger political context of the
dynamics between development and city hall also requires a concerted political organizing effort
that seeks to transform the current priorities of local government. Only by redefining San
Francisco as a space for people, culture, and community, rather than as a space simply for wealth
generation, can those fighting for justice in the city succeed.
There are many opportunities for future research concerning both the Central SoMa Plan
specifically, as well as planning and development in San Francisco more generally. As the
Central SoMa Plan is still yet to be adopted and approved, a study of the resulting effects of the
plan on development and displacement (including studying shifts in demographics) could be
done once the plan is adopted. The impacts on infrastructure could also be studied after the
plan’s likely implementation. On a wider scale, a more complete and thorough analysis of the
effect and impact of specific area plans in San Francisco could be undertaken. Questions include,
what has been the main function of specific area plans taken together as a whole? How do area
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plans more broadly relate to development and displacement in San Francisco? How do area plans
affect infrastructure, in relation to site-by-site development or no development at all? In terms of
studies that relate to planning and development as a whole in San Francisco, the question of
infrastructure is one major topic to be addressed. How does planning and development in San
Francisco address the issue of new infrastructure needed to meet new populations? Does new
development meet the needs of infrastructure? Larger demographic shifts (in terms of class, race,
gender, and sexuality) could also be studied in relation to new planning and development
patterns as set out by the Planning Department and the city.
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Figures
Figure 1: San Francisco Neighborhoods Map

Source: City and County of San Francisco. Accessed April, 2017.
http://sfgov.org/elections/sites/default/files/SF_Neighborhoods_June_2014.pdf
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Figure 2: Black or African American Population 2010 Map, South of Market

Source: Social Explorer
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Figure 3: Black or African American Population 2015 Map, South of Market

Source: Social Explorer
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Figure 4: Per Capita Income 2010 Map, South of Market

Source: Social Explorer
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Figure 5: Per-Capita Income 2015 Map, South of Market

Source: Social Explorer
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Figure 6: Age 18 - 64 Living in Poverty 2015 Map, South of Market

Source: Social Explorer
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Figure 7: Age 65 and Older Living in Poverty 2015 Map, South of Market

Source: Social Explorer
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Figure 8: Downtown Plan Boundaries Map, 1985 and 2009 (labeled “Current Downtown C-3
Zone)

Source: 25 Years: Downtown Plan Monitoring Report
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Figure 9: Downtown Plan Rezoning Map

Source: San Francisco Planning Department. Accessed April, 2017.
http://generalplan.sfplanning.org/images/downtown/dtn_map1.pdf
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Figure 10: The Eastern Neighborhoods Plan Boundaries Map

Source: San Francisco Planning Department. Accessed April, 2017. http://sfplanning.org/sites/default/files/FileCenter/Documents/1230Eastern_Neighborhoods_Planning_Areas_Map.pdf
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Figure 11: Eastern Neighborhoods Plan Rezoning Maps
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Source: San Francisco Planning Department. Accessed April, 2017. http://sfplanning.org/sites/default/files/FileCenter/Documents/1260EN_Adoption_Packet_BOS_VOL1_Zoning%26HeightsMaps_web.pdf
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Figure 12: Western SoMa Community Plan Boundaries Map

Source: San Francisco Planning Department. Accessed April, 2017. http://sfplanning.org/sites/default/files/FileCenter/Documents/7405wsoma_basemap_0509_8x11_revised.pdf
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Figure 13: Western SoMa Community Plan Rezoning
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Source: Western SoMa Community Plan
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Figure 14: Central SoMa Plan Boundaries Map

Source: Central SoMa: Plan and Implementation Strategy
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Figure 15: Central SoMa Plan Rezoning Maps
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Source: Central SoMa: Plan and Implementation Strategy
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Figure 16: Central SoMa Plan Height and Bulk Maps
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Source: Central SoMa: Plan and Implementation Strategy
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Figure 17: Central SoMa Plan Projected Development
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Source: Central SoMa: Plan and Implementation Strategy
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Figure 18: Renderings of new development (yellow) with existing buildings (grey)
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Source: Central SoMa: Plan and Implementation Strategy
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Figure 19: Central SoMa Plan Open House, Held at the Bayanihan Center on November 15,
2016

132

Source: David Woo, November 15, 2016
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Figure 20: Central SoMa Plan Open House November 15, 2016 Questionnaire
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Source: David Woo, November 15, 2016
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